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Abstract
When Turkey started its adoption of the European Union’s (EU) accession criteria 
for membership, an important area of the changes it adopted was in the area of freedom of 
speech. This thesis centres on the last ten years (2002-2011) of political reforms in Turkey 
respect to the freedom of speech and their relevance to the EU conditionality. 
As for any other candidates of the EU, also Turkish membership depends on the fulfilment 
of the conditions set by the EU. The conditionality is considered one of the most important 
strategies of the EU in promoting rule of law, human rights and democracy. 
Yet, because the dynamics of Turkey- EU relationship have been changing- it is possible to 
argue that the EU conditionality has been losing its credibility from the Turkish 
perspective. The issue of Cyprus, the role of veto players such as France and Germany 
hinder the willingness of Turkey to comply with the EU requirements. The disappointment 
of Turkey about the accession negotiations because of the ever-closing chapters caused 
Turkey to be less enthusiastic about the whole European project. 
This thesis claims that when the credibility of the EU declines, so does the effect of 
the EU political conditionality on consolidating democracy. This argument is investigated 
through the case of Turkey. 
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Özet
Türkiye, Avrupa Birliğine (AB’ye) üye olmak üzere değerlendirilme kriterlerini 
yerine getirme sürecine girdiğinde, yaptığı en önemli değişikliklerden biri de “ifade 
özgürlüğü” alanında oldu. Bu tez, Türkiye’de son on yılda yapılan politik reformların, ifade 
özgürlüğü konusunda, AB kriterlerinin etkisini inceleyecektir. Her Avrupa Birliği (AB) üye 
adayının olduğu gibi, Türkiye’nin de üyeliği bu kriterlerin yerine getirilmesine bağlıdır. 
Kriterler, AB’nin Hukuk, İnsan Hakları ve Demokrasi alanlarındaki en önemli teşvik 
stratejilerini oluşturmaktadırlar.Ancak, Türkiyedeki dinamikler –AB- Türkiye 
ilişkilerindeki son değişiklikler- nedeniyle, AB kriterlerinin demokratikleşme 
açısındanTürkiye üzerinde güvenirliliğini yitirdiğini söylemek mümkündür. Kıbrıs 
meselesi, veto etme yetkisine sahip ve bunu kullanan ülkeler olarak, Almanya ve 
Fransa’nın tutumu, Türkiye’nin, Avrupa Birliğinin öngördüğü kabul görme kriterlerini 
yerine getirme isteğine engel olmaktadır. AB’ye üye olmak için öngörülen kriterlerin yerine 
getirilmesi sürecinde açılan müzakere başlıklarının, Türkiye’den beklenen gereklilikleri 
yerine getirmesine rağmen, bir türlü tamamlanamaması, Avrupalılaşma Projesi’nde 
Türkiye’nin hevesini yitirmesine sebeb olmuştur. 
Bu tez, Avrupa Birliği’nin (AB’nin) Türkiye üzerindeki güvenirliliğinin azalmasına 
paralel olarak, AB siyasi kriterlerinin de demokratikleşme sürecindeki etkisinin azaldığını 
öne sürmektedir.
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1. Introduction
The enlargement of the Union has political, social and legal implications on both the 
member states and the candidates. This thesis centers on the effects of the EU enlargement 
policy on the Turkish democracy.
 It is claimed by many scholars that the EU’s most successful foreign policy has 
been its enlargement (Checkel, 2000; Grabbe, 2002; Schimmelfennig, Knobel and Engert, 
2003;  Schimmelfenning  and Sedelmeier,  2004;  Schimmelfennig,  2008;  Schimmelfennig 
and Scholtz; 2008; Lavenex and Shimmelfennig, 2011; Kubicek, 2001). After the fall of the 
Iron Curtain in the beginning of the 1990s,  with the application of numerous countries 
which  were  recently  out  of  a  long  standing  communist  regime,  the  EU has  made  the 
conditions  of  membership  to  ensure  the  democratic  stability  within  the  Union.  This 
initiative by the EU constituted one of the most influential instruments of its foreign policy;  
the political conditionality. 
Political conditionality becomes the most effective in consolidating democracy in 
candidate states when its credibility is high. The EU offers prizes like a full membership, 
material  assistance,  welfare  of  a  given  state,  and  military  protection  in  return  for 
compliance  with the EU conditions.  If  the target  country feels  that  the prize offered is 
credible, then they start to adopt EU criteria and harmonize their law in line with the ones 
made conditional by the EU (Schimmelfennig, Knobel and Engert, 2003; Schimmelfenning 
and  Sedelmeier,  2004;  Schimmelfennig,  2008;  Schimmelfennig  and  Scholtz;  2008; 
Lavenex and Shimmelfennig, 2011). 
These calculations were also during the membership negotiations with the CEECs 
countries in 1990s. To adapt to their new reality and cope with the remaining pressure of 
communism,  they  quickly  applied  for  membership  seeking  for  economic,  political  and 
social  assistance from the EU. It is argued that the effect of EU political  conditionality 
became very effective in democratic consolidation within CEECs (Schimmelfenning and 
Sedelmeier, 2004). This, of course, does not mean there were no backlashes in the Central 
and Eastern European countries, as currently witnessed in Hungary. 
The arguments on the effectiveness of EU conditionality are also applicable for the 
Turkish  case  even  though  Turkey  is  a  unique  case  in  this  respect.  It  has  a  long  and 
complicated history within the European. The undulant relationship between Turkey and 
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the EU caused the credibility of the EU unstable. The change in EU’s attitudes and the 
positions of member states on Turkish membership determined the credibility of the EU in 
the eye of Turkey. The hesitations of the EU over the years, especially after the Customs 
Agreement with Turkey in 1995, as well as the reservations of certain EU countries like 
Greece, France and Germany caused Turkey to question the promise of membership.  
From the very beginning of the Turkish Republic, Westernatization and becoming a 
part of Europe have been the main aspirations of the Turkish political  elite (Öniş, 200: 
466). The increasing strategic importance of Turkey against Soviet expansionism, Turkey 
gained the  opportunity to  become even closer  to  the  European/Western  order  (Yılmaz, 
2008: 1). Turkey now desired to take part in the institutions of the West like the Council of 
Europe and the NATO. However, the official Turkey- EU relationships started in 1959 with 
the first Turkish application to the EU and the Ankara Treaty in 1963. This was followed 
by a lot of rise and falls within the relationship of these parties. In 1995, Turkey joined the 
Customs Union, being the first country that became a part of it without being the member 
of the EU. The exclusion of Turkey from the list of candidates in Agenda 2000 and the 
result of Luxembourg Summit created a crisis in Turkey- EU relations (Aybey 2004: 30). 
However,  the  membership  prospect  was  given  to  Turkey  when  it  was  granted  with 
candidacy in 1999 at  Helsinki Summit.  This fortified the credibility of the EU political 
conditionality for Turkey (Müftüler Baç, 2005) Accordingly, Turkish reforms gained speed 
until  the  opening  of  Accession  Negotiations  in  2005.  After  the  start  of  accession 
negotiations, the dynamics of the whole relationship has changed since the whole duration 
of  opening  and  closing  chapters  necessitates  inclusion  of  multiple  actors.  Thus,  the 
membership prospect became more politicized in this process compared to the adoption of 
political criteria endangering the role of EU conditionality on the Turkish democracy.
The primary attention of this thesis is the concern of democratic consolidation and 
empowerment of human rights that Turkey has been undergoing, especially in terms of 
freedom of  speech  –freedom of  expression,  press  and broadcasting-  and the  degree  of 
influence of the EU pre- accession conditionality on the matter. 
At this point it is necessary to explain the relevancy of the effects of conditionality 
on freedom of expression in Turkey is necessary. Even though Turkish democracy has been 
established approximately a century ago, because it was electoral democracy there hasn’t 
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been a considerable emphasis on the freedom of expression. In line with this, freedom of 
speech – freedom of expression, press and broadcasting- has been absent. For a long time, 
the media was at the hands of the governments and it was used to manipulate and to guide 
the public in line with dominant political agenda. The military interventions of Turkey did 
not help the freedom of speech either. After the military coup of 1980, the Constitution of 
1982 was established restricting and limiting this freedom extensively. Turkey candidacy in 
the EU in 1999 brought back the hopes of guaranteeing democratic rights, especially the 
freedom of speech (Christensen, 2010:178). 
However, with previously mentioned concerns and problems in Turkey’s relations 
with the EU, the Turkish progress on freedom of speech has not proven to be very effective 
even though there have been numerous legislative changes to comply with EU criteria. 
Currently, more than 100 journalists imprisoned, numerous books and websites are banned 
in Turkey because of several different political reasons. This frightening picture of press 
freedom in Turkey makes this research relevant. 
This  thesis  proposes  that  Turkey’s  political  reforms,  specifically  in  the  area  of 
freedom of speech, have been largely motivated by the EU accession process. However, the 
analysis for Turkish transformation requires different sets of tools to be used compared to 
the analysis of political conditionality in the Central and Eastern European countries. In this 
regard  it  will  provide  information  on  and  evidence  for  how  and  when  EU  political 
conditionality becomes credible and relevant in a complex case such as the Turkish one. 
Having said all of these, the structure of the thesis should be pointed out. The first 
chapter constitutes the theoretical framework of the thesis. The first part gives insights on 
the EU political conditionality as an effective instrument to foster democracy in candidate 
countries  followed  by  the  conceptual  framework  including  the  hypothesis  and  the 
definitions of relevant variables along with the ways to assess those. The latter part of this 
chapter includes the experience of CEECs on the matter as it is crucial to see how and why 
EU political conditionality became a success story. The second chapter of the thesis tracks 
the Turkey -EU accession process from 1997 Luxembourg Summit towards present day, 
while also touching upon the role of Cyprus and the reception of mixed signals from the 
EU as hurdles for the credibility  of the EU. The third chapter  assesses the freedom of 
speech  in  Turkey  through  different  indicators.  To  start  with,  the  Regular  Commission 
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Reports on the State of Freedom of Expression, Press and Broadcasting in Turkey between 
the years 1998 and 2011 are analyzed. Secondly, Freedom House rankings on Turkish press 
freedom, in the 2002- 2011 period, are examined. And lastly, the numbers of cases which 
are brought to the European Court of Human rights and resolved against Turkey on the 
violation of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights between 1999 and 
2010  are  taken  into  account.  Finally,  the  conclusion  displays  the  positive  correlation 
between the credibility of pre-accession conditionality and the speed and effectiveness of 
Turkish reforms.  
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2. Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework
In the early 1990s, the promotion of democracy has become one of the most 
influential foreign policy focuses of the EU. The rules and requirements set by the EU 
occurred as a result of the application of numerous countries lacking sufficient levels of 
democracy to become members of the Union. With the Turkish candidacy in 1999, Turkey 
has also become obliged to fulfil these criteria. Thus, it will be used as a case study to 
examine the impact of EU political conditionality on democracy in target states.  
This chapter analyzes the main framework for the EU conditionality and the main 
theoretical approach to understand its impact on target states. Firstly, the basic indicators of 
EU’s impact will be mentioned; the EU conditionality and the factors critical in its efficacy 
will be taken at hand. To serve the main aim of this thesis, a special focus will be given to 
the credibility of EU conditionality. Secondly, the concepts - EU conditionality, its 
credibility and freedom of speech as an indicator of democracy- regarding the main 
hypothesis will be defined.  In the same part, the rational behind choosing the sources –
Annual Progress Reports, decision of European Court of Human Rights and Freedom 
House ratings- which will be used to assess freedom of speech as an indicator of democracy 
in Turkey will be touched upon. And lastly, the experience of political conditionality used 
in democracy promotion in Central and Eastern Europe will be mentioned.  The experience 
in CEECs is significant in observing the effectiveness of the credibility of EU political 
conditionality and its potential for political reforms in countries aspiring for membership. 
2.1. Basic indicators of EU’s impact: EU Conditionality and its efficacy
The EU emerged in international politics as a unique organization which influences 
social and political change in the countries aspiring for membership. Some scholars argue 
that the EU has evolved as the representative of liberal democracy influencing its 
neighbourhood. Hence, it has become one of the major agents of promoting democracy in 
the region. It has attributed itself as the “community of democracies” and because of this 
attribution the EU desires to strengthen its own democracy (Lavenex and Shimmelfennig, 
2011). However, this role had not been one of the top priorities until the 1990s when the 
EU has officially and explicitly highlighted its aims to promote democracy. First with the 
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1992 Maastricht Treaty and then by the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria, the promotion of 
democracy has become one of the main expected consequences of the EU’s foreign policy. 
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004) explain the EU’s foreign policy through 
the external incentive model of governance.  This model is based on an understanding of 
rationalist bargaining in which the parties involved are the strategic-utility maximizers. The 
parties would like to maximize their power and welfare, specifically their perceived 
material benefits. This bargaining between the EU and domestic actors begins as a result of 
differences between the domestic status quo and the demands of the EU. The domestic 
equilibrium determines the status quo. Moreover, this equilibrium, which is defined as the 
differences between the existing distribution of preferences and the bargaining power 
within the given society, is distressed because of the introduced EU conditionality. The 
bargaining that involves exchanges of information, threats and promises and the outcome is 
determined through the bargaining power of the parties (Moravcsik, 1998). According to 
Moravcsik and Vacudova (2003) “those countries that gain the most by engaging in more 
intense interstate cooperation …has the most intense preferences for agreement. They are 
thus willing to compromise the most.”
According to this bargaining model, EU external governance follows a strategy of 
conditionality –sometimes referred as “leverage” - that is a top-down approach for 
democracy promotion through a set of EU rules. Some of these rules and norms were 
explicitly stated in the Copenhagen Council of 1993 (Lavenex and Shimmelfennig, 2011). 
They have, of course, evolved over time with the increased emphasis on the EU level 
norms for the protection of human rights and democratic stability.  The Copenhagen criteria 
of 1993 have three main layers of conditionality for the countries aspiring membership. The 
first layer is the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy including rule of law, 
human rights, and respect and protection of minorities. The second layer is a functioning 
market economy that will allow the states to cope with the market forces within the Union. 
The last one is the compatibility of the law of the prospective members with the 
Community law, also called the acquis communitaire (Grabbe, 2002).  
The EU conditionality generally follows a “reinforcement by reward” approach with 
the rare use of punishment if the candidate fails to conform to the EU’s accession criteria. 
In this approach, a social party uses the instrument of reinforcement to obtain a desired 
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change in the behaviour of another party.  (Schimmelfennig, Knobel and Engert, 2003) 
There is no coercion or punishment affecting the cost and benefit calculations of the target 
party; however, one could think of the withdrawal of accession benefits as a punishment 
but it is more the possibility of future benefits that mobilizes the candidate to adopt 
reforms. The EU rewards the target country if it complies with the requirements and 
withholds the rewards if it fails to comply with them. In line with these, the relationship 
between the EU and the target governments is asymmetrical as the trump is in the hands of 
the EU. This also to be expected as the candidate is aiming to join the EU which already 
has its own rules and norms in place.
The effectiveness of this EU guided conditionality depends on several factors. To 
begin with, the outcome of the cost and benefit calculations by the target states are 
determinant. Tangible material rewards are considered the most powerful incitement, while 
the non-material incentives and mechanism of social learning is less relevant 
(Schimmelfennig, 2008). The material rewards offered by the EU can be divided into two 
categories: the institutional ties and assistance. Institutional ties include all kinds of trade 
and cooperation agreements, association agreements and full membership plus inclusion in 
the European common market. In addition, because conditionality changes the domestic 
opportunity structure –ideologically- in favour of domestic actors, the adoption of rules 
depends on the decision of the target governments. These governments are in search for a 
new domestic equilibrium through balancing the requirements of the EU as well as the 
demands of international and domestic actors (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004). 
Within the process of rule transfer, there are too many interdependent variables 
shaping the efficacy of EU conditionality that need clarification and organization for the 
aims of this thesis.  Hence, a scientific equation is necessary to see this interdependence of 
these variables unmistakably. The next section is on the formulation of hypothesis and the 
definitions of all its variables.  
2.2. Conceptual Framework
The need for operational definitions arises with the possibility of different 
interpretations of the terms and concepts that might jeopardize the empirical testability of 
the hypothesis. Thus, it is crucial to narrow down and clarify the definitions of all the 
fundamental concepts that constitute the skeleton of the thesis in advance. This thesis 
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questions whether when the credibility of the EU membership prospect is high, the impact 
of the EU’s political conditionality is substantial or not on the freedom of speech as an 
indicator of democracy. This proposition is investigated through an analysis of the freedom 
of speech in Turkey. Corresponding to the purpose of this study, this section provides the 
hypothesis serving the main research question, definitions of the terms included in this 
hypothesis, and the rational for choosing certain index to assess “democracy”. 
2.2.1. Exploration of Terms 
In order to define and explore the terms relevant to the thesis, first, there is the need 
to identify the variables within the research question. So, within the thesis statement “when 
the credibility of the EU membership prospect is high, the impact of the EU’s political 
conditionality is substantial or not on the freedom of speech as an indicator of democracy”, 
the independent variable is “the EU conditionality” and “its credibility” while the 
dependent variable is “the freedom of speech as an indicator of democracy”. 
To begin with, EU conditionality, the independent variable, simply refers to the 
conditions set by the EU in Copenhagen in 1993. Furthermore, it is the use of EU 
incentives to alter a target state’s behaviour or policies (Checkel, 2000 cited in Erdogan, 
2006: 3). The effectiveness of conditionality has two contexts: the democratic 
conditionality and acquis conditionality. These contexts are purposefully separated because 
it proved that the effective rule transfer of the EU is context dependent (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier, 2004). The context of democratic conditionality is the political principles 
of the EU based on the human rights norms and liberal democracy. It requires the political 
change towards liberal democracy. In the same line, it demands a fertile domestic ground 
(Schimmelfennig, 2008:918) where reform oriented political forces can come to power. 
The main external incentive here is the establishment of institutional ties. The incentive of 
democratic conditionality losses its effect once the accession negotiations start although the 
Commission continues to monitor the adoption of democratic conditions. The context of 
acquis conditionality starts with the preparation for membership. Therefore, this context 
becomes noteworthy only after the opening of accession negotiations with a candidate 
country. Given these two contexts, the democratic context of conditionality is more relevant 
for the concerns of this thesis
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Credibility has been defined as “the expectation that an announced policy will be 
carried out” (Drazen & Masson, 1993 cited in Bronk, 2002:6). It is about the reliability of 
EU’s delivery of threats and promises in the cases of target governments’ compliance with 
the criteria and their non-compliance with them. The interdependence between the EU and 
the candidates or target countries is r in favour of the EU that is because generally the target 
countries are heavily dependent on the EU and will get more benefits than the EU from any 
kind of association or accession. (Moravcsik and Vachudoca, 2005: 201 cited in 
Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008:191) Consequently, the weaker party aspires to get 
rewarded in return for applying certain behaviour. (Erdogan, 2006) This creates the 
superior bargaining power of the EU, therefore, EU has to assure that the requirements will 
be fulfilled from the side of the EU. There are many factors that help “credibility” to be 
influential on the efficacy of EU conditionality.  Most importantly, the commitment of the 
EU is seen by the dates of possible accession.
The capability of and costs for the EU is one of the decisive factors of the worth of 
conditionality. The EU has to be capable enough to deliver the promises it has given. As 
Kubicek states (2011: 912) “why assume costs if benefits are uncertain?” Accordingly, it 
can be argued that if the promises falls short of its capabilities then the target countries 
might have second thoughts about the deals and thus, the effect of conditionality lessens. 
This is related to the asymmetrical relationship involved in the process because it is the EU 
that reinforces the candidates’ willingness to change and it has to show that the eventual 
payment will take place. Additionally, there are costs for the EU that is not visible to the 
eye – they are also called “sunk costs” by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 665). As 
a result of long term negotiations and preparations and restructuring the EU institutions for 
further enlargement of the Union, the process becomes really costly for the EU. However, 
in the long run the EU becomes more credible in the eye of the target countries as they see 
that the EU is paying a price. The credibility of the EU once again increases with the 
opening the negotiations with other candidates which shows the level of commitment by 
the EU. 
Another important factor that increases the credibility is the consistency of the EU 
delivering rewards and upholding them. The target countries have to be in no doubt that 
they are going to receive the benefits when they fulfil the criteria and they have to be also 
15
sure that the EU will uphold the rewards in the case of non compliance. The internal 
conflicts within the EU and the reception of mixed signals from the EU might jeopardize 
the credibility of the EU and target countries might end up not trusting the EU and would 
be tempted to manipulate or confused. In the end, this might cause a loss of influence and 
lessening of the impact of the conditionality.  For example, France and Germany, the two 
most important powers of the Union, are against Turkish membership. For instance, in 
2007, the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy stated that “Turkey’s place is not Europe” 
(Muftuler- Bac, 2008). Prior to this, in 2004, Stoiber, the then CSU chairman in Germany, 
has mentioned a concept “privileged partnership” to Europe rather than having more 
members (Bürgin, 2010). The current discourse of the German government has a similar 
attitude, Merkel, the current chancellor of the government, pushes for privileged 
partnership for Turkey instead of a membership∗. This position of the governments not only 
affects the internal dynamics of the European Union but it creates mixed signals for the 
target country, Turkey. As a result, it negatively affects the credibility of the EU political 
conditionality on Turkey. 
  “Turkey should not view her offer of a "privileged partnership" - rather than full membership - negatively, 
she said.” BBC News, March 29, 2010
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2.2.2. Assessing Democracy 
As the dependent variable is “the freedom of speech as an indicator of democracy”, it is 
essential to define democracy and the ways to assess the state of freedom of speech in 
Turkey as one of the indicators of democracy.
It should be highlighted that the EU conditionality in this thesis is handled through the 
context of democratic/political conditionality. The main incentives that the EU offers in this 
context are the institutional ties. Thus, democratic conditionality becomes less relevant for 
the target states once the accession negotiations start. Even though democratic 
conditionality falls on the background of the domestic agenda after the start of accession 
negotiations, it remains its vital role in the agenda of the EU. Thus, it is critical for the 
target countries to take the annual reports of the European Commission into account to 
secure the membership prospect, at least to a certain degree.  In 1997, the European Council 
asked the European Commission to prepare Progress Reports for each applicant country 
evaluating their ability to meet the EU’s accession criteria as set by the 1993 Copenhagen 
summit.  The applicant countries would then see the extent to which they conform to the 
EU’s accession criteria. The European Commission’s evaluations are the first stages to be 
fulfilled on the road to membership, as an applicant country cannot be declared a candidate 
unless the Commission recommends this based on the political aspects of the Copenhagen 
criteria and negotiations for accession cannot begin unless the candidate fulfils the political 
criteria in its entirety.
In order to understand the Commission’s evaluations, one needs to assess the meaning of 
“democracy”. It is of great importance to explain and narrow down this concept. The 
clarification is needed to comprehend the democratic system embraced and fostered by the 
EU and the freedom of speech as one of the components of democracy can be understood 
or measured.
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The democratic system that the EU fosters is the main focus in this thesis. Although the EU 
does not provide a definition of democracy per se, it could be argued that the EU uses a lot 
of democratic components to describe the democracy it relies on. It measures the 
democratic status of the prospective members through a number of criteria –or democratic 
components- in a qualitative fashion in the annual Commission Reports. The state of 
democracy in a target country is evaluated through the status of the parliament, 
government, public administration, civil- military relations, judicial system, anti-corruption 
policy as well as the implementation of human rights and protection of minorities. Freedom 
of expression and speech is evaluated under the title of “civil and political rights” within 
the framework of human rights. The problem is that the EU does not define any concepts 
that are included in the requirements for candidates. The Accession criteria set in 
Copenhagen Council in 1993 state that “the candidate country must have achieved the 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities”.1 However, this statement could not provide any specific 
definitions; they are mostly vague and slippery concepts (Grabbe, 2002:251). When the 
Copenhagen Criteria was set, it has defined the broad and vague framework of EU political 
conditionality. However, by time it added up certain content like the anti-corruption 
measures, measures regarding rule of law and administrative capacity; it developed 
throughout time and thus, tried to fill the gaps in the first framework (Džihić and Wieser, 
2011: 1805)  These advancement became more visible for the target governments through 
the yearly evaluations of the Commission.
In this thesis, the status of freedom of speech including freedom of expression, press and 
broadcasting will be used as one of the indicators of democracy in Turkey. The evaluation 
will be mainly based on the annual reports of the European Commission on the freedom of 
expression and freedom of press in Turkey from 1998 until 2011, the reports of the 
Freedom of House on the ranking of freedom of expression in Turkey from 2002 until 2011 
and the cases decisions of European Court of Human Rights regarding freedom of 
expression and press in Turkey that were covered by the Commission reports on Turkey 
between 1998 and 2011. These data can be found in detail in the 3rd Chapter of this thesis.
1 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm 
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2.2.2.1. Annual Progress Reports of the Commission 
The EU’s political criteria have evolved over time with an increasing 
emphasis on the importance of democratic credentials. The political criteria of the 
EU were set in the beginning of the 1990s.  The European Commission has always 
evaluated the applicants to EC/EU accession on the basis of their democratic 
credentials in its Opinion. However, this evaluation changed format with the 
adoption of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. With its Progress Reports, the 
Commission evaluates the extent to which the applicant countries fulfil the criteria 
and in which areas it needs further reforms. These reports are not just instruments 
of the EU to decide on the faith of the target countries. Although the reports are sent 
to the Council and the Parliament to see the status of candidates for the purposes of 
further enlargement, they are also guidelines for these countries to consolidate their 
democracy. It is on the basis of Commission’s Report and recommendations that 
candidacy is granted, accession negotiations begin, chapters are opened and 
accession negotiations continue without suspension. The Progress Reports are the 
main documents upon which the Commission recommendations to the Council are 
made, without which no enlargement process is possible. 
The Commission Reports on Turkey has been issued since the conclusions of 
Luxembourg European Council in 1997 showing the progress made by Turkey in 
preparing for membership. These reports have high significance for the aims of this 
paper as they are the only direct documents that are evidence for EU’s perspective 
on the status of democracy –and freedom of speech and press- in Turkey.  The first 
report on Turkey was published in 1998 based on the conclusions of the 
Luxembourg European Council and Ankara Agreement.2 The evaluation of the EU 
on Turkey on the political side was that there were “certain anomalies in the 
functioning of the public authorities, persistent human rights violations and major 
shortcomings in the treatment of minorities... In addition, Turkey must make a 
constructive contribution to the settlement of all disputes with various neighbouring 
countries by peaceful means in accordance with international law –which is a 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/turkey_en.pdf 
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reference to the Cyprus issue-” This report has also become the basis for the first 
Accession Partnership Document∗ in March 2001. 
The Commission’s progress reports are sometimes based on the decision of 
the European Court of Human Rights. Even though, they are institutions of different 
organizations – the European Commission is a body of the European Union while 
the ECHR is the judiciary organ of Council of Europe-, the EU and the Council of 
Europe have been cooperating for a long time, particularly in regards to protection 
of human rights, democracy and rule of law. The relationship between Council of 
Europe and the EU, as well as the ECHR decisions and Commission Reports will be 
touched upon in “the Decision of the European Court of Human Rights” section of 
this thesis. 
 
2.2.2.2. Resolved Turkish Cases brought to the European Court of Human 
Rights 
The European Court of Human Rights one of the bodies of the Council of 
Europe (CoE) founded in 1959. CoE is an international organization promoting 
cooperation between countries of Europe –not only the EU states-to promote human 
rights, democracy, rule of law and enhance cultural interaction. CoE was founded in 
1949, just after World War II, as one of the results of European efforts to prevent 
any kind of wars in the future between European countries. It has 47 members – 
with Turkey as one of the founding members-. Unlike the EU, it does not have 
binding laws. It draws standards, charters and conventions for the member countries 
to follow. The European Convention of Human Rights was one of these efforts 
 The purpose of the Accession Partnership is to set out in a single framework the priority 
areas for further work identified in the Commission’s 2002 Regular Report on the progress 
made by Turkey towards accession, the financial means available to help Turkey 
implement these priorities and the conditions which will apply to that assistance. The 
Accession Partnership provides the basis for a number of policy instruments which will be 
used to help the candidate States in their preparations for membership. It is expected that 
Turkey on the basis of this revised Accession Partnership adopts a revised national 
programme for the adoption of the acquis. Further information on Accession Partnership 
can be accessed through http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/140403.pdf
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adopted in 1953 and ratified by all 47 members. The Convention is an international 
treaty that protects human rights and fundamental freedoms. It also established the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1959 as the guardian of this Convention. The 
Court is also the judiciary organ of the CoE. It hears the cases of human rights 
when a contracted state violates them. This court has sanction power over the 
countries that signed the ECHR. The court decisions are binding. It has the power 
to sanction states to pay material or moral damages as well as the all the legal costs. 
It also gives opinions as a result of certain cases which are not binding for the 
members. 
Even though, the Council of Europe and the EU are separate institutions; 
they have long ties in the history. They have been supporting each others efforts for 
a united Europe. “We need not waste our time in disputes about who originated this 
idea of United Europe”, Winston Churchill insisted in 1948, at The Hague. Thus, in 
what they –CoE and the EU- do, and in what they have done, they complement each 
other closely (Juncker, 2006: 5).3 For the same reason, the EU and CoE has signed 
and ratified numerous Conventions of CoE. The one convention that all member 
states have subscribed to is the Convention on Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Following this, they have recognized the jurisdiction of 
European Court of Human Rights as well.4 This recognition and the desire of the EU 
to ensure the protection of human rights –also with the Copenhagen Criteria- led the 
EU to use the court decisions as indicators of human rights situations in target 
countries. Consequently, the EU included the court decisions into the Commission 
Progress Reports for those target countries to show them that the EU accounts for 
the decision of the court and that they are not just expected to fulfil the EU 
requirements but also the requirements of the European Human Rights Convention.5
3 Can be accessed through www.coe.int/t/der/docs/RapJuncker_E.pdf 
4 http://www.uaces.org/pdf/papers/0801/2008_Bond.pdf
5 For further information on the cooperation of the EU and CoE on the human rights: 
http://spice.stanford.edu/docs/human_rights_protection_in_europe_between_strasbourg_an
d_luxembourg/, http://www.uaces.org/pdf/papers/0801/2008_Bond.pdf, 
www.coe.int/t/der/docs/RapJuncker_E.pdf, http://www.coe.int/t/der/docs/MoU_EN.pdf
21
For the purposes of this thesis the Article 10 of this Convention is relevant and 
necessary. It refers to the “freedom of expression”: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. this right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article 
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television 
or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 6
It is fruitful to include the number of cases brought to ECHR by whom 
Turkish state was found guilty on the basis of the above mentioned article. 
Although, it is not possible to cover the content of the articles, observing the 
variation of their numbers over the years, especially in 1999-2011 period- is 
useful when evaluating the progress of freedom of expression in Turkey in the 
last decade. 
2.2.2.3. Freedom House Ratings
The third main instrument used to assess the Turkish democracy –freedom 
of speech and media- is the Freedom House rankings. The evaluations of Freedom 
Hose are not based on the “European Convention of Human Rights” but based on 
6 The ECHR can be found at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/ENG_CONV.pdf 
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the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” which is adopted by the members7 of 
United Nations in 1948. As a result, it provides an outside –Western but non-
European- perspective on the state of democracy in given countries -Turkey being 
one of them. Thus, it is advantageous to use the data provided by this index because 
of a possible coherence between Freedom House ratings, the ECHR decisions and 
the Commission Reports on the freedom of speech in Turkey.  This coherence 
would fortify the data used for this thesis as well as the conclusion drawn from 
those data. 
The Freedom House supports democratic change, monitors freedom, and 
advocates for democracy and human rights around the world (Freedom House).8 It 
conducts researches on these areas and publishes annual reports based on a rating 
system. There have been several methodological drawbacks of the Freedom House 
index detected by Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen (2002). However, the ones 
that are relevant to the framework of the thesis are the ones related to the attributes 
of the concept of “democracy” and its measurement.
To begin with, it is being criticised of having a maximalist definition of 
“democracy” by scholars (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). It means that it includes too 
many attributes in the meaning of the concept that overburdens the concept. 
Overburdening has two potential drawbacks; decrease in its usefulness in a way to 
destroy the concept’s empirical referents and reduction of its analytical use (Munck 
and Verkuilen, 2002). Furthermore, the measurement of democracy is made through 
an ordinal scale. This is also criticised by Schimmelfennig (2008) because of the 
reductionist system of measurement. It divided the countries into three categories: 
free, partly free and not free and thus creates a threshold problem. Moreover, it is 
argued (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002) that the Freedom House did not set forth any 
justification for the use of such measurement. Plus, there is no internal consistence 
of the data series that raises questions on the validity of the measures. 
7 In 1948, 48 of the members of UN has voted in favor of the Declaration , there was no 
country voted against and  8 countries –USSR, Ukranian SSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, South Africa and Saudi Arabia- were absent.  
8 http://www.freedomhouse.org/about-us 
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Despite all its shortcomings, the Freedom House evaluations of democracy 
and its ratings specifically on several issues are relevant and fruitful for the purposes 
of this thesis. First of all, the ratings of the political rights and civil liberties are 
overlapping with the norms of liberal democracy taken into account by the EU 
(Schimmelfennig, 2003: 96 and Schimmelfennig, 2008). Secondly, the ratings are 
up to date so one can see the progress of certain countries on certain issues –like 
freedom of expression in Turkey in the last decade.
The rankings of Freedom House, the progress reports of the Commission 
Reports and the decisions of the ECHR on the cases brought against the Turkish 
state on the status of democracy in regards to freedom of speech in Turkey will be 
specified and mentioned thoroughly in the 3rd Chapter. 
2.3. The Experience of the Central and Eastern European countries
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) have undergone a major change 
at the last two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Certainly, it was not only 
the transformation power of the EU, but also various international actors –like the Open 
Society Foundation, American Bar Association, NATO, etc.- and different factors –like the 
domestic dynamics- had a role in determining the speed and shape of these changes. As 
Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier (2004:662) put it: there is no direct causal link between 
conditionality and successful rule transfer in particular issue- areas. However, despite the 
negative aspects  and limitations of conditionality –e.g. it holds a top-down approach and in 
some issue- areas it can not ensure the applicability of certain laws- it contributed to the 
adoption of international human rights and minority rights standards, it supported the 
effectiveness and efficiency of democratic institutions, and it emphasized the need to fight 
corruption and organized crime (Džihić and Wieser, 2011: 1804) Thus, it can be argued that 
the EU has been one of the most influential actors in the region thanks to its external 
governance instrument “conditionality”.
There has been several factors shaping the effect of conditionality on target 
countries. In the case of CEECs, although all the factors - the determinacy of conditions; 
size and speed of rewards, the credibility of conditionality and the veto players and 
adoption costs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004) - are involved in the whole process 
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of rule transfer, the one that concerns this thesis is the credibility of the conditionality 
shaping the faith of rule transfer which is relevant for the Turkish case as well. 
The credibility of the EU political conditionality has been high in the case of 
CEECs with minor exceptions. For instance, Belarus and Ukraine were not given a 
membership perspective even though they would have fulfilled the conditions. Nonetheless, 
in most of the CEECs there were association agreements with the EU and they were all 
given the membership perspective. To evaluate how the credibility as an intervening 
variable had an impact on the efficacy of conditionality, it is better to see the cases of 
CEECs on the basis of sub-determinants of credibility: capabilities and costs of the agency 
employing conditionality, allocation of rewards, internal conflict within the EU and cross-
conditionality. 
- The condition of capabilities and costs of the EU were present in the CEECs 
relation with the EU. The absence of alternative ideological or systemic paradigms 
for the Central and East European candidate countries (CEECs), other than EU 
membership, has tended to reinforce the widespread perception of a power 
asymmetry in favour of the EU (Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, 2004: 
524).Accordingly, the benefits out of membership became greater for CEECs than 
for the EU. This means that the cost for this enlargement was higher for the EU than 
the CEECs. Still, the EU was capable of providing the promises and withholding 
them in cases of non- compliance. Yet, once the EU enters the road to the accession 
negotiations, it becomes even more costly to stop them because of all the process 
that it has to go through. This situation does not help the credibility of exclusion in 
the cases of non-compliance. As in the example given by Dimitrova (in 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 84), the requirement of the EU in 
administration reforms did not have a significant effect on the Czech government as 
the government believed the threat of exclusion rather considered itself as one of the 
candidates that would eventually become a member of the Union. 
- Allocation of rewards has had both positive and negative effects on EU political 
conditionality in the cases of CEECs. First of all, the exclusion of Slovakia in 1997 
from the list of candidates as a result of non compliance with the EU rules has been 
an incident showing the seriousness of the EU on the matter of conditionality. As a 
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result of the decision of Helsinki European Council in 1999 –which also a turning 
point in the Turkish case-, the rewards were allocated fostering the effect of 
conditionality. Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania were given their rewards with the 
start of accession negotiations as a result of their progress (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005: 15) However, there have been several cases that the rewards were 
distributed not because of compliance with EU rules but out of strategic policies of 
the EU which jeopardized the credibility of conditionality. For instance, Russia was 
rewarded with aid and institutional ties although there have been severe violation of 
human rights in Chechnya (Smith, 2001: 39 cited in Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005: 39). A similar incident happened in Romania and Bulgaria; they 
were rewarded by the EU because they were needed for the support of NATO action 
in Kosovo (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 15). So, allocation of rewards 
was not always supportive of the effect of EU conditionality.
- Internal conflict within the EU institutions –which is a very important factor for the 
EU- Turkey relations- sometimes created weak adoption of acquis in certain areas. . 
In the cases of CEECs, inconsistent signals were given in specific policy areas that 
the EU was trying to foster. For instance, the regional policy was a conflicting area 
within the Commission. There has been contradicting and shifting visions on the 
regional policy within the Commission, particularly between the DG of 
Enlargement and the DG of Regions whether to promote centralized or 
decentralized management of regional policy in CEECs (Hughes, Sasse and 
Gordon, 2004: 542). This led to the perception by the CEECs that there was 
conditionality in this area but it was inconsistent. This has contributed to the 
lessening of EU credibility on particular issue-areas. 
- Cross-conditionality was certainly an issue of concern in CEECs because of parallel 
or additive conditionality imposed by other international actors like Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe, and NATO 
along with UN reinforced the human rights conditions in a lot of CEECs. Their 
pressures overlapped and thus led to successful democratic consolidation on those 
areas. Plus, as stated several times in previous parts the EU was the only actor 
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offering a credible alternative for the CEECs because of their over-dependency to 
the EU budget.  
As can be observed in this section, there have been variation among CEECs in a lot of 
issue-areas because of the difference of the effect of conditionality both in terms of cost of 
adoption for the target countries and the credibility of EU political conditionality in the eye 
of those target states.  However, it is possible to see that when the EU’s accession process 
is credible or seen as credible by the candidate country, the pace of political reforms is 
substantial. The analysis of the CEECs demonstrate that the EU accession process is 
equipped with the potential for political reforms in countries aspiring for membership, 
specifically when they perceive the accession process as credible. 
2.3.1. How to account for the variation of the impact of conditionality among 
Central and Eastern European Countries 
Although there have been general achievements fostered by the EU conditionality, 
the CEECs can not be evaluated as one monolithic entity. There have been variations 
among the countries of CEECs.  Here, I would like to mention only three short examples 
just to show the variation of the influence of EU conditionality among CEECs. The 
variation is mostly observable through the criteria related to the democratic conditionality, 
human rights and minorities because those criteria made the conditionality policy more 
demanding and more difficult to satisfy (Pridham, 2008).  They also required governments 
that are willing to make reforms, therefore, do not perceive the change in these specific 
areas as “costs”. So, the adoption costs as an intervening variable has played a major role in 
these issue-areas. Yet, although there were fluctuations as a result of cost-benefit analysis 
of different governments in given countries, EU conditionality has proven to be effective at 
least in terms of drawing legal frameworks on the related issues. The examples showing the 
variation of the efficacy of democratic conditionality –generally because of perceived costs 
of compliance- here, are from Latvia, Estonia and Slovakia. 
After the fall of the Iron curtain, Latvia has started to give automatic citizenship to 
the citizens of inter-war Latvian Republic and their descendants. This policy made 30 
percent of the population stateless and deprived of their political rights.  The government 
put some more laws into force regarding to the use Latvian language, education and 
economic rights that discriminated the non-Latvian population. (Pabriks, 1999 cited in 
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Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003) Latvia has set a minimum of the EU 
requirements within approximately a decade responding to the Regular Reports of the 
European Commission in order to fulfil the criteria and got rewarded. A superficial and a 
minimum change in the Latvian legislation granted them the membership that came in May 
2004. The absence of a regulatory system was also apparent in the post- membership term 
through the numbers of non-citizens and aliens living in Latvia. But despite these, there 
have been remarkable pressure from the EU on the change and implementation of relevant 
legislation. 
A similar case is the Estonian language reforms. Again the reluctance of Estonia 
and non-regulation after the admission to the EU can be seen through the implementation 
of a new law in 2007 by extending the power of language inspectors in Latvia. This law has 
granted the inspectors by giving them the authority to dismiss employees by claiming 
insufficiency in Estonian language (Haughton, 2011).
Similar practices have happened with the judicial reforms as well as the reforms on 
the anti-corruption law in Slovakia. (Pridham, 2008) A very hard transformation of judicial 
system has taken place in Slovakia. The progress report of the Commission (2002) just 
before its accession to the Union states that the developments in the judicial system “are 
most welcome, and represent considerable progress. Due attention should now be given to 
ensuring their proper implementation, including by making the necessary funds available. 
In particular, it will be important that the newly established Judicial Council can play its 
role to the full.”9 The lack of implementation and change in behaviour is also reported in 
the 2002 Commission report “Surveys indicate that corruption remains cause for serious 
concern in Slovakia. The Commission acknowledged the anti-corruption efforts of the 
Slovak Government but indicated that a number of important measures had not yet been 
undertaken and should not be further delayed.”10
Of course, there have been numerous issues underlying the limitations of the EU’s 
external incentive particularly in regards to the context of democratic conditionality. 
However, these three small examples would at least make the shortcomings of EU political 
conditionality more concrete and visible. All in all, it can be argued that the EU has been 
9 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/sk_en.pdf
10 Ibid. 
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the pioneer of democratization in Central and Eastern Countries but its influence could not 
go beyond setting up a legal framework (Vachudova, 2005). Plus, the limits of the EU 
conditionality, especially in regards to implementation of democratic standards, post- 
accession compliance, participation of citizens, and the variation of its effects are 
observable. In line with these observations, the main objective of the thesis is to see the 
effect of democratic conditionality on the Turkish democracy -especially in regards to 
freedom of speech that is a though area for effective rule transfer, furthermore, to find out 
whether the credibility of conditionality has had a noteworthy role in that. 
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3. Chapter 2: Turkey – EU accession process (1997- 2012)
This chapter analyses the historical evolution of Turkey’s relations with the EU and 
traces the main turning points in this complex relationship. Particular attention will be 
given to the period of 1997- 2012, the period which covers Turkey’s candidacy and the 
start of accession negotiations. 
3.1. Turkey: a part of the European Order
Turkey has long historical ties with the Western order even though there have been 
various debates on Turkey’s place in Europe. Modernization and westernization in Turkey 
have roots in the Ottoman Empire starting from the 19th century, in particular with 
Tanzimat reforms of 1839 to 1876. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of 
the 20th century is followed by the establishment of modern day Turkey. During the 
foundation years, the Turkish elite gave special attention to the Western and European 
values. “Westernization” and “European Identity” have always been fundamental goals for 
the Turkish political elite from the very inception of the secular Republic in 1923 (Onis, 
2000: 466). That means that Turkey wished to be a part of the West and the European order 
for a very long time. 
With the coalescence of Turkish desire to be a part of the European order and 
European desire to keep Turkey close because of its strategic role in region, institutional 
ties between these two parties started to form. At the end of the Second World War, a new 
European order was created to eliminate the possibility to all-out European war. Thus, they 
began to sign agreements and established the institutions that would work to prevent any 
possible European wars in the future. Council of Europe (CoE) was one of these institutions 
established in 1949 and Turkey was one of its founding members. Within the structure of 
CoE, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
was signed by most of the members of CoE in 1954 and once more, Turkey was one of 
them. Moreover, during the Cold war, Turkey’s importance in the region increased, 
especially when it became a part of the NATO alliance in 1952.  
In 1957, with the signing of the Rome Treaty, the foundation of European 
integration process was laid out with the establishment of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the Euratom. These communities along with the European Coal and 
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Steel Community (ECSC) established in 1951 marked the origins of the EU.  In two years 
time, Turkey applied for Associate Membership of EEC and five years later, in 1963, it 
became an associate member of the Community through the Ankara Agreement. 
Ankara Agreement11 was the first official steps in the long history of Turkey’s 
relations with the European Union. It prepared the economic grounds and conditions -a 
customs union and labour mobility- for the integration of Turkey to the Community (Onis, 
2000). The integration was envisaged at the end of three stages (Article 3 of the 
Agreement): a preparation stage aiming at strengthening of the Turkish economy for further 
economic integration (Article 2 of the Agreement); a transitional stage intending to 
eventually establish a customs union (Article 4 of the Agreement); a final stage aspiring for 
the formation of the customs union (Article 5 the Agreement). The reason behind holding 
on to this three stage structure was to ensure “an accelerated development of the Turkish 
economy and to improve the level of employment and the living conditions of the Turkish 
people to achieve the greater objective of founding a continuous and balanced economic 
and trade relations between parties” (Article 2 of the Agreement). 
Although these three stages eventually proved to be successful, in should be noted 
that the Ankara Agreement did not give a membership prospect to Turkey. It only implied a 
future consideration of a possible accession. The Article 28 of the Agreement states that “as 
soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full 
acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the 
Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of 
Turkey to the Community” 
The first stage of the Association, the preparation, was given a go with the 
additional protocols included in the Ankara Agreement in 1963. Then, in 1973, the 
adoption of the additional protocol12 marked the beginning of the transitional stage by 
laying down the conditions, arrangements and timetables (Article 1 of the Additional 
Protocol) for the economic progress of Turkey. However, 1970s and 1980s can not be 
considered as the fruitful years in advancing relations between Turkey and EEC. There 
11 For the text of the Ankara Agreement: http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=117&l=2 
12 For the text of the 1970 Additional Protocol: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX:21970A1123%2801%29:EN:HTML
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have been suspensions coming from both parties in different years. In 1978, then Turkish 
Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit suspended the Association Agreement because he wanted a 
revision of the Association Agreement that contradicted with Turkey’s then economic 
development strategy based on industrialization and import substitution. Meanwhile, the 
Turkish intervention of Cyprus in 1974 and the Turkish military coup that took place in 
1980 hindered any advance in Turkey- EEC relations. This time, in 1982, it was the 
European Parliament that suspended the Association (Müftüler Baç, 2005). 
In 1987, the desire of and the pressure coming from Turgut Özal -who became the 
president with the democratic elections in 1983- let to Turkish application for full 
membership (Onis, 2000) At the time, Turkey did not only wish to take part in EEC just 
because it wanted to be a part of the European order but as a result of several strategic 
calculations. In 1981, Greece became a member of the Union and gained a veto power in 
the Community putting Turkey in a disadvantageous position. Plus, Spain and Portugal also 
became members in 1986 jeopardizing the trading advantage of Turkey by offering the 
same kind of goods to EEC. 
As a response to Turkish application, the Commission gave a recommendation13 in 
1989. It stated that Turkey was a large country that had the potential to become the largest 
among the members with a very slow pace of development. Plus, the Turkish democracy 
found to be fluctuating and thus, the Turkish integration seemed to be unlikely as a medium 
term goal. Also, the gap between the economic growth of Turkey and EEC countries was 
found too big again hindering the adoption of Turkey to the European competition. 
Moreover, the political context was also evaluated negatively. The 1982 Constitution, 
human rights and the situation with Cyprus were the main concerns of the Commission. As 
a result, accession negotiations were found inappropriate for the Community although it 
was said that the Commission was still interested in close relations with Turkey, especially 
because of Turkey’s strategically important geopolitical position (Article 12 of the 1989 
Commission recommendation). Yet, the Customs Union and close financial, political and 
13 For the text of Commission Recommendation on Turkey in 1989: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/commission-opinion-on-turkey_s-request-for-accession-to-the-
community_-december-20_-1989.en.mfa
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social ties with Turkey were found appropriate which gave a powerful push for the 
realization of Association terms. 
The final stage of Association took place with the inclusion of Turkey to the 
Customs Union in 1995. At this stage, the Council laid out rules clarifying the obligations 
that need to be fulfilled for both of the parties for the proper functioning of the Customs 
Union. With the Customs Union, Turkish hope to become a full member of the Union 
flourished. However, the hopes went in vain with the Turkish exclusion from the list of 
candidates announced in 1997 (Eralp, 2000; Müftüler Baç, 2002; Müftüler Baç, 2005; 
Grigoriadis, 2006; Gordon and Taspinar, 2006). The most critical period in terms of 
Turkey’s relations with the EU and the EU’s impact on Turkish political system arrived at 
the end of the 1990s with the EU’s new enlargement process. 
3.2. Agenda 2000 and Turkey in the Luxembourg summit
In 1997, the European Commission adopted its recommendation for the EU 
enlargement, the Agenda 2000. The Agenda 2000 was created for the development of the 
EU and its policies with a consideration of the future enlargement. It also set up financial 
strategies for the first seven years of the new millennium that also counted for the 
Commission opinions on the application countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Agenda 
2000).14 The Agenda was focused on the all applicant countries, and proposed all the 
applicants to be elevated to candidacy but it left Turkey out of the enlargement process at 
that time.  
Following the Agenda 2000, the Luxembourg European Council convened in 1997 
to adopt the European Commission’s recommendation in this package. It established rules 
and made decisions for the future of Europe and launched the enlargement process. It was a 
significant moment for the future of the EU since the Council decisions launched the 
largest enlargement wave in its history. The Council made decisions after considering the 
situation in eleven applicant countries at the time. It decided to give candidate status to all 
Central and Eastern European applicants and Cyprus. In addition, the Council also led to 
14 For the text of Agenda 2000: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/2004_and_2007_enlargement/l60001_
en.htm
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the decision of opening accession negotiations with 6 of these candidate countries based on 
their ability to meet the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria. The accession 
negotiations with the remaining five would begin once they also satisfied the political 
criteria.  Turkey was excluded from the list of candidates even though it had the longest 
standing applicant and it was the only country that had a Customs Union agreement with 
the Union (Eralp, 2000; Müftüler Baç, 2005), because the Commission and the Council 
argued that it did not meet the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria.  It can be argued 
that Turkey was given a special status because even though it was left out as a candidate, it 
was included in the enlargement process. There was a separate section for Turkey that is 
called “a European strategy for Turkey”. In this section Turkey’s eligibility for full 
membership was accepted and it was declared that Turkey was objected to the same criteria 
just like the other candidates. Nevertheless, Turkey’s political and economic conditions 
were marked unsatisfactory to open accession negotiations. It was also stated that the future 
of Turkey- EU relations were dependent on Turkey’s progress in alignment of human 
rights, respect for and protection of minorities, and in the relations with Greece and Cyprus. 
Some of these conditions can even be considered as additional conditions set up for Turkish 
candidacy. The absence of the status “candidate” and additional conditions other than the 
Copenhagen Criteria caused Turkey to feel disappointed and offended; and consequently, 
created a crisis in Turkey’s relations with the Union until December 1999 when Turkey 
was finally granted the candidate status (Müftüler Baç, 2005; Grigoriadis, 2006; Gordon 
and Taspinar, 2006).
3.3. The developments in 1998 and the Commission evaluation in 1999
Despite the Turkish resentment of 1997, Turkey and the EU kept their relations 
intact on the basis of the Association Agreement. In 1998, at the Cardiff Summit of the 
European Council, it was decided that Turkey should be monitored by the Commission 
every year just like any other candidate even though Turkey was not given the candidate 
status (Müftüler Baç, 2005) These efforts were a result of the Association Agreement 
because as mentioned before, article 28 of the Association Agreement states that when the 
progress is satisfactory enough the parties can consider the possibility of full membership 
for Turkey. This article acted as a safeguard for a possible future Turkish membership and 
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the efforts of publishing progress reports from 1998 onwards made Turkey feel like it was 
being treated just like the other candidate countries helping out to ease the tensions between 
the EU and Turkey.   
In addition, in 1998 Commission drafted another European Strategy for Turkey as a 
result of the Council’s request that is drawing a strategy to get Turkey and the EU closer in 
every field. The Strategy involved: development of the possibilities afforded by the Ankara 
Agreement; intensification of the customs union; implementation of financial co-operation; 
approximation of laws and adoption of the Union acquis; and participation, to be decided 
case by case, in certain programmes and in certain agencies (European Strategy for Turkey, 
Commission Initial Operational Proposals, 1998) 15. These strategies show that the EU 
actually acts as if Turkey was a candidate, especially by stating the need to approximating 
the laws and adoption of the acquis.
All of these; suspensions of Association, the exclusion of Turkey from the list of 
candidates in 1997 but still continues monitoring and strategies for Turkey show hesitations 
of the EU to include Turkey. Correspondingly, these hesitations raise the questions and 
stimulate Euro-scepticism in the Turkish part.  
The 1998 Progress Report16  on Turkey reflected the unsatisfaction of the 
Commission from the then Turkish status quo. It marked that there was major human rights 
violations along with a lack of civilian control because of the place of the army and the 
National Security Council in political life. It also highlighted Turkey’s relationships with its 
neighbouring countries, implying that Turkey has to find constructive solutions to the 
Cyprus issue. In terms of implementing and practicing the rules of the Customs Union, 
Turkey was found successful, yet, the credibility and stability of macro- economic 
framework in Turkey found absent. As a result, the Commission concluded that it is not 
15 For the  text of the European Strategy for Turkey, 1998: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/european-
strategy-for-turkey---the-commission_s-initial-operational-proposals-_brussels_-4-march-
1998_.en.mfa
16 For the text of the Progress report on Turkey, 1998: 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/Turkey_Progress_R
eport_1998.pdf
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possible to offer any opinions on the Turkish capacity to apply the parts of the acquis that 
were not transposed (Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 1998)  
However, despite the tension between the EU and Turkey, on realistic terms, there 
has been interdependency between these two parties (Onis, 2000; Eralp, 2000). The 
importance of Turkey as a strategic –especially its place in NATO- and economic power 
necessitated the EU to fortify the Customs Union and go beyond it. To act as a positive 
party in EU’s relations with NATO, Turkey wanted to assure its place as a candidate 
country and thus, required a confident strategy for membership from the EU (Eralp, 
2000).Plus, being a part of the Customs Union meant “competition without full integration” 
and it also meant “loss of sovereignty with limited participation” for Turkey (Onis, 2000: 
475) From the Turkish side as well, the EU was still the benefactor that Turkey looked up 
to for economic, social and political reasons. So, the realization of this interdependency led 
to a positive break through in EU- Turkey relation with the Helsinki European Council 
Summit in 1999.  
Before the Helsinki Summit held in December 1999, the Commission Report on 
Turkey was published in October 1999 leading to breakthrough in the Turkey EU relations. 
The Commission stated that there were still major concerns on the fulfilment of 
Copenhagen Criteria, especially in terms of human rights violation and lack of protection of 
minorities; still, it acknowledged the efforts of the Turkish government and parliament in 
regulating political life, the justice system and protection of human rights. In terms of 
economic requirements and the ones dictated by the Customs Union, Turkey was found 
progressive despite the fact that it needs improvements in certain areas like copy right law, 
distribution of income and regional disparities. Nonetheless, overall Turkish administrative 
capacity to apply the acquis in the framework of the Custom Union was found very 
satisfactory (Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 1999)17 The Commission 
recommended lifting Turkey into candidate status and as a result of this recommendation, 
17 For the text of Regular Commission report on Turkey, 1999: 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/Turkey_Progress_R
eport_1999.pdf
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the European Council in its Helsinki Summit of 1999 elevated Turkey’s status to 
candidacy.
3.4. The Candidacy: Helsinki summit and beyond
On December 10- 11 1999, European Council had made certain points and decisions 
to prepare the Union for the future enlargement. Within this enlargement framework, 
Turkey was also granted with the candidate status. The Presidency Conclusion says:
“The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted 
in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards 
complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the 
Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.”
In line with this, the Council also included Turkey to the pre-accession strategy 
compromising of enhanced political dialogue with the emphasis on the fulfilment of 
political criteria, especially in the field of human rights. The Commission was once more 
asked to evaluate the state of Turkey on the adoption of EU acquis and fulfilling the 
political criteria. ,
The development in Helsinki Summit can be marked as a U-turn from the part of the 
EU. The reason is that the EU was subjecting Turkey to the criteria set for the candidate 
countries without giving the status, although in the Association Agreement a possible 
membership was implicitly mentioned. With this turn, the EU provided a membership 
prospect to Turkey in return for compliance with EU rules. This prospect has improved the 
credibility of the EU political conditionality on the eyes of Turkey giving a push for 
Turkish dedication for reforms to comply with the political criteria. 
Although, the Helsinki Summit has been the turning point in Turkey- EU relations, 
the EU hesitations on Turkish membership did not vanish. This was observed during the 
Nice Summit and the decisions taken regarding institutional reforms. During the Nice 
European Council in 200018, there have been several reforms envisaged to obtain 
stabilization of institutions after the big enlargement wave. For instance, the weight of 
votes in the Council that will be implemented after 2005 was redistributed to ensure a fair 
18 For the text of Presidency Conclusions of the Nice Summit, 2000: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/nice1_en.htm
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share for all countries including the prospective members. During this distribution, the all 
of the candidates were accounted for and given their share of votes but Turkey was once 
again left out. The Council might have several reasons of reaching this decision. The most 
probable reason in this particular case might be the worries of EU member states on the 
impact of Turkey because of its size because the weigh of votes is determined by the size of 
the country which is more than 70 million inhabitant in the case of Turkey (Müftüler Baç, 
2005) With that number Turkey ranks the second largest country in the EU after Germany. 
Thus, on one hand, it is very reasonable for the EU to have concerns on the matter. On the 
other hand, after giving the candidate status to Turkey, leaving Turkey out in certain areas 
is not helping the credibility of membership prospect given to Turkey. 
3.5. 1999-2002 the slow progress in Turkish reforms
After the unpleasant development of exclusion of Turkey from the institutional 
reforms in 2000 which undermined the Helsinki Decision’s positive effect on Turkey- EU 
relations, another satisfying development for Turkey occurred with the preparation of the 
Accession Document by the Commission in 2000 and its adoption by the Council in 2001. 
This document was prepared as a consequence of the Helsinki decisions on Turkish 
candidacy and established timetables, goals and objectives for Accession Partnership. It 
also made the preparation of a Turkish national programme mandatory in order for Turkey 
to adopt the Union acquis. The objectives set in this document were based on the 
Commission Report on Turkey in 2000.19 This document gave Turkey the motivation to 
take action because it was a factor showing the commitment of the EU to its promise of 
membership. Accordingly, the credibility of membership prospect increased. With this 
motivation, in 2000, the Turkish Parliament adopted a constitutional reform, three reform 
packages and a National Programme for the adoption of the acquis –NPAA- (Christensen, 
2009). In its National Program, Turkish government stated that “Turkey will accede to all 
relevant international conventions and take the necessary measures for their effective 
implementation in order to ensure alignment with the universal norms manifest in the EU 
19 For the text of Council Decision on Accession Partnership with Turkey, 2001: 
http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/File/EU&TURKEY/l_08520010324en00130023.pdf
 
38
acquis and with practices in EU Member States, particularly in the areas of democracy and 
human rights”.20 
With the immense constitutional package of 2001, Turkey has touched upon the 
issues of freedom of expression and revised the death penalty with 34 amendments to the 
Constitution (Müftüler Baç, 2005). In addition, it adopted a new civil code aiming at 
enhancing the gender quality. These efforts of Turkey were also observed and appreciated 
by the European Commission. In the Regular Commission Report on Turkey 200121, the 
Commission marked the Turkish NPAA as a step forward. It also highlighted the attention 
given by the Turkish government to the freedom of thought and expression, the prevention 
of torture, the strengthening of civilian authority, freedom of association, and gender 
equality when amending the 1982 Turkish Constitution –it was established after the 1980 
military intervention and had severe democratic problems-. However, the improvements 
were also found unsatisfactory in terms of their implementation. For instance, the banning 
of the Fazilet Party by the Constitutional Court was considered a serious obstacle in the 
way of obtaining freedom of expression. 
In the last term of the coalition government, Turkey has undergone big changes 
regarding human rights. With the 3rd Constitutional Package, the coalition government 
abolished the death penalty, revised anti terror law and allowed broadcasting in languages 
other than Turkish (Müftüler Baç, 2005: 22, table 1). These were the last constitutional 
package and the reforms that the AKP-MHP-ANAP coalition has adopted. 
Although there had been several important reform packages put forward during 
1999-2002 because of several reasons these processes were interrupted and they could not 
been as effective as the packages adopted after 2002. One reason for the failure of fast 
movement in this period was that the presence of a coalition government at the time. 
Concerning political parties, Euro-scepticism is mostly seen as an opposition party 
phenomenon in order to gain ground against governments (Sitter 2001; Taggart and 
Szczerbiak 2004; Gifford 2006 cited in Gülmez, 2008). Accordingly, the existence of the 
20 For the text of the Turkish National Program on the Adoption of the Acquis: 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=195&l=2
21 For the text of Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2001: 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/Turkey_Progress_R
eport_2001.pdf
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right wing party Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) as one of the coalition parties had 
negative effects on the compliance with certain EU conditions. For instance, MHP opposed 
to the draft of the new civil code during the negotiations, although it the changes were 
adopted at the end. Of course, MHP regarded the EU imposed rules and conditions as 
attempts hindering the sovereignty (Gülmez, 2008). Plus, there were three parties in the 
coalition government at the time it was MHP, CHP and ANAP- Motherland Party-. The 
existence of these three parties caused conflicts during the decision making process because 
of their different preferences. Moreover, the emergence of economic crises in Turkey in 
2001 acted as another impeding factor to keep up with the European conditions. Not only 
because of the lack of economic capacity to cope with all the changes but also because of 
different positions held by these three coalition parties when managing the economic crises. 
Still, the reforms done and the NPAA adopted between the years of 1999 and 2001 
were found impressive by the Commission in 2001. Still, Commission proposed22 
alterations and gave strategies for the incoming Turkish NPAA. This period can be seen as 
a positive development in Turkey- EU relations, although the Turkish transformation was 
rather slow and less effective in comparison with the next wave of reforms conducted by 
the governing party, namely Justice and Development Party- AKP- elected in 2002. 
The 2002 Regular Progress Report on Turkey23 was the last report evaluating the 
process of Turkish reforms done by the coalition government since AKP was elected at the 
end of the year, its efforts could not be evaluated in that year. This last report stated that 
there was still an active role played by the military officers especially in respect to 
education, cultural rights and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. It was also 
highlighted the progress done by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd constitutional packages adopted by the 
coalition government formed by CHP-MHP-ANAP, particularly in respect to the human 
rights. Commission reported that “Overall, Turkey has made noticeable progress towards 
meeting the Copenhagen political criteria since the Commission issued its report in 199812, 
and in particular in the course of the last year. The reforms adopted in August 2002 are 
particularly far-reaching”. Yet, Commission underlined that further progress was needed in 
22 İbid. 
23 For the text of the Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2002: 
http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/uyelik/progre02.pdf
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regards to political conditionality in order to open accession negotiations. It was the turn of 
the AKP government that should take these Commission opinions into account in its 
following governing years.  
3.6. 2002-2005 Reforms gain momentum, accession negotiations began
The period of 2002-2005 has been really fruitful for Turkey’s compliance with the 
EU conditions. In the year of 2002, a new election has taken place and it can be argues that 
because of the outbreak of the economic crisis and because of internal disagreements in the 
coalition government, Justice and Development Party –AKP- the leader of which is Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan won the elections in November 03 by getting the 34, 39% of the national 
vote. This victory enabled AKP to govern the by its own eliminating the possible of any 
inner conflicts that occurred during the governance of the previous coalition government.
Meanwhile 2002 marked a historical milestone in the EU’s enlargement process. 
The Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen Council Summit that took place in 12-13 
December 2002 declared that from 2002 onwards the accession negotiations were 
completed for Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Thus, they would become members from 01 
May 2004 onwards.24 Nonetheless, Turkey was left out from the countries because of 
several reasons put forward by the Council. First of all, the progress made by Turkey was 
acknowledged, yet, those were found unsatisfactory because of the lack of their 
implementation. So, the Council not only wished to see the legislations on paper but it 
requires their full implementation. It also made it clear that the determination of the new 
Turkish government to take further steps on the path of reform and of eliminating the 
shortcomings in the field of political criteria and hopes that with the fulfilment and progress 
that would be made by this new government can lead to the opening of accession 
negotiations in the European Council Summit of 2004 without delay.
This implied promise of start of accession negotiations in Copenhagen Council in 
the case of compliance increased the credibility of membership prospect because the 
declaration of possible dates of the accession showed once again the commitment of the EU 
24 For the text of Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen Council 2002: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/council-eu-27.pdf
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to the Turkish membership even though Turkey was not declared as one of the countries 
that were granted with the initiation of accession negotiations. In line with this, the newly 
established government has initiated a fast and effective reform process.  
In the first month of its governance, AKP adopted the fourth and fifth constitutional 
reform packages. In the 4th one, it functionalized previous reforms adopted by the coalition 
government and revised penal code. With the 5th package, in order to refer to EU’s 
consideration of State Security Courts as the obstacles in the way of democracy, it initiated 
retrials of the cases that were decided by these Courts. Until the year of 2004, AKP has 
taken enormous and impressive steps in way of complying with EU conditions: 
abolishment of death sentence through adoption of Protocol 6 of ECHR; revision of the 
National Security Council; amendments of the constitutions in regard to freedom of press; 
abolishment of State Security Courts; revised the Higher Education Board and the Censure 
Board; revised laws on violence against women and children (Müftüler Baç, 2005: 22, 
table). 
All these changes were evaluated in a positive way by the EU as well. In the 
Regular Commission Report 200325, the packages of political reform taken it that year were 
found significant because of their implications on the freedom of freedom of expression, 
freedom of demonstration, cultural rights and civilian control of the military. In spite of 
these positive evaluations, Commission highlighted the importance of the implementation 
phase of all the adopted legislations. Commission also observed the efforts and 
determination of AKP to fulfil the criteria to open accession negotiations in the year of 
2004. In the next Commission Report in 200426, civilian control of the military has been 
found strengthened. Political reforms adopted through all of the constitutional reforms and 
reform packages have been acknowledged and found effective by the Commission. A 
remarkable evaluation on this report was the positive evaluation of the Commission of the 
steps taken for the implementation of reforms by the government. And the relation with 
Cyprus was also found positive thanks to the support of the government for the efforts on 
25 For the text of the Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2003: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_en.pdf
26 For the text of the Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2004: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf
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UN Secretary General to find solution to the Cyprus dispute. Yet, in certain areas like some 
legislations are found limited like the new penal code regarding the freedom of expression, 
freedom of religious belief, child labour and honours killings, broadcasting and education 
in minority languages. All in all, it was stated that “the Commission expects a positive 
reply to the draft protocol on the necessary adaptations transmitted to Turkey in July 2004” 
which means that the Commission gave a positive opinion to the Council on Turkey’s 
status and its compliance with EU conditions. This raised hopes of Turkey to open 
accession negotiations in the Council Summit later on in 2004.
The Presidency Conclusions of December 14- 15, 2004 announced that Turkey 
sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations provided 
that it brings into force these specific pieces of legislation27. In line with this decision, in 
October 2005, Turkey’s longing for membership was very close to satisfaction with the 
official initiation of accession negotiation with the EU. The accession was still based on the 
Copenhagen Criteria but this time more attention was given to the full and effective 
implementation of pre- accession strategy and reforms, especially particular efforts should 
be made on the issue like the independent functioning of judiciary, cultural rights, civil- 
military relations, and active participation of Turkey for the peace and stability of the 
region. Furthermore, the Council also emphasized the significant of the adoption and 
compliance with the acquis. Although, the process had already begun, Council 
recommended that it should be accelerated and intensified. 
27 For the text of the Presidency Conclusion on Turkey, December 16-17 2004: 
http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files//presidency_conclusions16_17_12_04_en.pdf
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With the opening of accession negotiations, Turkey- EU relations has reached the highest 
point in their history that starts with the Association Agreement in 1963 followed by the 
Turkish application for full membership in 1987. Even so, at this point there are several 
remarks that should be done in the effect of EU conditionality on Turkish reform process. 
First of all, as highlighted in the first chapter of this thesis the incentive of democratic 
conditionality looses effect once the accession negotiation start although the Commission 
continues to monitor the adoption of democratic conditions through its annual regular 
reports. Secondly, even though the CEECs and Cyprus were granted with membership only 
two years after the start of accession negotiation, this turned out to be very long process for 
the Turkish case. It is the year 2012 and Turkey still waits for its membership. From the 
start of accession negotiations on, the Turkey- EU relations once again started to go down 
hill because of the stalled process arising out of political concerns. Hence, the credibility of 
political conditionality has been decreasing because of numerous factors that will be 
mentioned in the next section. 
3.7. 2006-2012 Stalled process and lessening of the EU credibility
After Turkey was officially declared a candidate state in 1999, a marathon of 
accession procedures has started as seen in the previous sections. The process included the 
development of stable institutions that ensures the goodwill of democracy, a big laps 
towards a “certain” level in protecting and fostering human rights as well as minority 
rights. It also required Turkey to expand its market economy and to be able to cope with the 
one within the Union. Total transference of EU acquis to the Turkish legal system was the 
last and the broadest step to be taken towards membership that officially initiated after the 
opening of accession negotiations in 2005. Though, transference of the aquis is a painful 
and time consuming route that includes several steps. First of all, there is an analytical 
approach of the Union called the “screening process”. During this phase, both sides –the 
candidate country and the EU- get to know each others’ legislative framework which is 
called “explanatory session”. So, the Commission and the member states decide whether a 
country is ready for all the changes on a certain topic. As the legal framework of the EU is 
rather a complicated one that covers Treaties, cases of law, resolutions, recommendations, 
declarations, common actions, decisions, conventions, International Treaties that the EU 
has signed for, and so much more, first of all it is crucial for the Commission to sit on the 
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same table with the candidate country –in this case Turkey- and explain the system of their 
legal system. Secondly, to be able to organize and follow up the changes in a given country, 
the EU has divided the acquis into thematic chapters. As a result, during the explanatory 
sessions the EU decides on preparedness of the candidate to make changes on a certain 
chapter. After this, bilateral meetings take place. During these meetings, the candidate 
explains their status and future plans on a certain chapter. However, the final say is on the 
hands of the member states making the decision of opening and closing a chapter. This 
analytical and objective approach becomes a tool of political games when member states 
become the decision makers. The whole matter of transference of acquis and the evaluation 
of this transfer becomes an intergovernmental decision rather than a supranational one. 
The challenge here is that assessing whether a candidate country fulfils the criteria 
to become a member should be based on objective criteria. However, it can be argued that 
as the decision about the acquis chapters are at the hands of different governments, the 
governments act according to their political interests. It is also at the hand of the member 
states deciding to block a chapter. As a result, the whole nature of relationship changes its 
course from the EU- Turkey relationship towards relationships of Turkey and several 
member states. Since all member states have an equal say for the opening of chapters, in 
every round Turkey encounters possible vetoes from those members who have material 
conflicts of interests with Turkey like Greece and Cyprus or just plain objection to 
Turkey’s accession such as France and occasionally Germany and Austria. These internal 
conflicts within the EU delivers Turkey mixed signals. Consequently, the EU becomes 
inconsistent in delivering rewards even though Turkey complies with EU rules resulting in 
the decrease in the credibility of EU political conditionality and thus, the slow down of 
Turkish political reforms.   
3.7.1. Cyprus Issue
Turkey and Greece have a problematic relationship that has very long roots in their 
history. There have been several attempts to solve these problems by bilateral meetings, 
agreements and initiatives -like Brussels Declaration of 1975, Bern Agreement 1976, 
bilateral negotiations developed in Montreux in 1978…- but so far no effective solution 
could be found. Particularly, as a result of the fading British control on Cyprus in the 
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1950s, there have been disagreements on the status of this island that fractured the already 
complicated relationship between Turkey and Greece (Aksu, 2010). 
This complicated relationship between Turkey and Greece was challenged even 
more with the Turkish intervention of Cyprus in 1974 only 14 years of the independence of 
Cyprus. Cyprus gained its total independence from Britain in 1960 through signing the 
Treaty of Guarantee with Britain, Turkey and Greece as the guarantor powers over Cyprus. 
In 1974, as a response to Greek military junta’s presence on the island, Turkey sent troops 
to Cyprus claiming its right to use force to main the stability on the island given to it 
through the Treaty of Guarantee. This intervention caused the “de facto” partition of 
Cyprus into two parts: the Turkish and Greek parts of Cyprus. The northern part declared 
independence in 1983 which has only been recognized by the Turkish Republic. What’s 
more is that this political division of the island caused social and identity breakdowns 
between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots leading to the transfer of motherland 
nationalisms in both countries to the territory of the island (Tannam, 2012: 52).  
The accession of Greece to EEC in 1981 turned Cyprus issue into an internal matter 
of the Community (Eralp, 2009). Moreover, in 1990 Greek administration in Cyprus 
applied for EC membership. Three years later, in 1993, the Commission declared that 
Cyprus was eligible for membership and it would eventually become a member of the 
Union.28 It should be noted that all EU external decisions are made unanimously and 
unanimity rule and this rule in the EU decision making process provided Greece with 
leverage in influencing Turkey’s relations with the EU (Grigoriadis, 2005: 2). Greece used 
this leverage and vetoed Turkey’s inclusion to the Customs Union first in 1993 and then in 
1995 (Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005: 287). The motivation behind this veto was to ensure 
the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Accordingly, once the EU agreed to open accession 
negotiations with Cyprus, Greece lifted its veto and Turkey could become a member of the 
Customs Union on 31 December 1995. These vetoes showed how Greece used its 
advantageous position in the EU against Turkey over Cyprus dispute and how it acted as a 
supporter and facilitator in the accession process of Cyprus. Not surprisingly, these were 
28 For the text of Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for 
Membership: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/cyprus/com93-
313_en.pdf 
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not welcomed by the Turkish part. In addition, Turkey’s expectation of being in the list of 
candidates in 1997 failed while the same year Cyprus was in the list of candidates. 
The sombre atmosphere started to change in 1999 because of the catastrophic 
earthquakes in Greece and Turkey. The extent of loss and suffering stirred emotions in both 
countries (Rumelili, 2004: 17) created a positive atmosphere to cooperate. As indicators of 
mutual good will, Georgios A Papandreau –then Prime Minister of Greece- and Ismail Cem 
–then Turkish foreign minister- initiated a dialogue on low profile issues like tourism 
promotion, removal of landmines along the border, illegal migration (Betül Çelik and 
Rumelili, 2006; Grigoriadis, 2003). Thanks to this positive atmosphere, without any 
opposition from the Greek side Turkey was given the candidate status at the Helsinki 
Summit in 1999.  
It can be argued that Helsinki decisions had an important role in Cyprus-Greece-
Turkey triangle because it stipulated the resolution of conflicts with Greece as a pre-
condition for Turkish accession (Eralp, 2009). Given the membership prospect, the EU 
political conditionality became very effective for the Turkish part. The linkage between the 
solution of Cyprus dispute and the start of accession negotiations were clear and Turkey did 
not want to risk its membership to the EU. Hence, it changed its stand on the issue. 
Conversely, the resolution of this conflict was not a pre-condition for the accession of 
Cyprus. In 2003, EU welcomed Cyprus to the Union without a solution to the problem. 
Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General made a plan, the Annan Plan, for the settlement of 
the problem in the emerging EU framework. On one hand, the desire of Turkish Cypriote 
leaders to create a more constructive environment for the process of accession of Turkey 
resulted in the 64, 90% (Chadjipadelis and Andreadis, 2007:5) support rate in the Northern 
part. On the other hand, the absence of any condition regarding the settlement of the issue 
caused Greek Cypriots to reject the plan with a 75, 83% (Chadjipadelis and Andreadis, 
2007:5) vote rate. The collapse of the Annan Plan and the failure of UN Secretary 
General’s mediation efforts caused new problem between Turkey and the EU (Aksu, 2010: 
214). 
After the accession of Cyprus to the Union in 2004 both Turkey and the EU shifted 
their position on the matter because both of their credibility has declined in each other’s 
eyes. The EU started to display a rigid attitude claiming that Turkey was not willing to 
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apply necessary reforms while Turkey felt that EU was unwilling to welcome Turkey by 
continuously delaying the membership and providing double standards for other applicants 
(Eralp, 2009) –like Cyprus-. As a result, the EU used its “Additional Protocol” card as a 
trump against Turkey. According to the Additional Protocol signed in 1970, Turkey had to 
open all its airports and seaports to all the members of the Union which now included 
Cyprus. During the negotiations on these terms, Turkey asked for a simultaneous lifting of 
all restrictions on Cyprus including the ones applied to the Turkish Cypriot part. Yet, 
neither Turkey nor the EU compromised leading to a more tangled relationship between 
Greece, Cyprus, Turkey and the EU. Thereto, in 2006, under the Finnish Presidency the 
Council decided in particular to suspend negotiations on eight chapters29 relevant to 
Turkey’s restrictions with regard to Cyprus, and will not close the other chapters until 
Turkey fulfils its commitments under the Additional Protocol to the Turkey-EU association 
agreement, which extended the EU- Turkey customs union to ten member states, including 
Cyprus, in May 2004.30 This meant that even though Turkey had progress in those eight 
areas and even though it fulfils the political criteria, it can not become a member of the 
Union unless it solves out the Cyprus problem. As a result, the membership prospect 
become vague and the credibility of EU political conditionality declined for Turkey.  
The perceived application of double standards of political conditionality which is 
experienced through the Cyprus case, the Greek vetoes over Turkish inclusion to the 
Customs Union for national benefits and the suspension of eight chapters caused the 
accession process to lose its attractiveness for Turkey. 
29 The eight chapters are Chapter 1 Free movement of goods; Chapter 3 Right of 
establishment and freedom to provide services;  Chapter 9 Financial services; Chapter 11 
Agriculture and rural development; Chapter 13 Fisheries; Chapter 14 Transport policy; 
Chapter 29 Customs union; Chapter 30 External relations accessed through 
http://www.avrupa.info.tr/AB_ve_Turkiye/Muzakereler,Muzakereler_Sayfalar.html?
pageindex=3
30 For the text of the press release of 2770th Council Meeting: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/92122.pdf
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3.7.2. Privileged Partnership and Mixed Signals from the EU 
With a long history dating back to 1963, Turkey’s submission to the EU 
membership has been controversial. Although, the Helsinki Summit granted Turkey the 
candidate status, it did not ease the disagreements between Turkey and the members of the 
EU. The election of Justice and Development Party –AKP- in 2002 changed the course of 
Turkey’s relations with the EU thanks to the quick reform process that AKP adopted. 
Turkey soon adopted numerous reforms and constitutional packages to comply with the EU 
rules. Even though there have been rises and falls, Turkey showed enormous progress 
towards membership and was finally given the membership perspective with the start of the 
accession negotiations in 2005. Nonetheless, discussions on EU’s enlargement fatigue and 
its absorption capacity did not help the doubts on Turkish accession to disappear. There 
have been several debates about Turkey’s status in the EU; while some countries, like 
Britain, were in favour of the Turkish accession, some others opposed to it. More recently, 
oppositions to the prospect of Turkey’s full membership have been translated into support 
for alternative mode of advanced EU-Turkey relations called “privileged partnership” 
(Grigoriadis, 2006: 153). 
The “privileged partnership” alternative was first offered by German Christian 
Democratic parties (Bürgin, 2010: 420) as an answer to the absorption problem of the 
Union.  Angela Merkel, the leader of Christian Democratic Union and the leader of the 
Bavarian Christian Socialist Union (CSU) Edmund Stoiber became the primary advocates 
of “privileged partnership” option to gain support of the German public that was not in 
favour of Turkish accession to the Union. A similar case was observed in France too. First 
in 2004, by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and then by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2005 (Grigoriadis, 
2006:154) mentioned the alternative for Turkish membership. In the elections of 2009, both 
Sarkozy and Merkal once more highlighted their stands in favour of privileged partnership 
for Turkey and won the public. It was not only Germany and France but also Austria seeks 
for alternatives to Turkey’s inclusion to the EU. Chancellor Wolfgand Schuessel said in 
October 2005 that he acknowledges popular concerns over the expansion of the Union and 
thus pushed for alternatives for Turkey.31
31 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4299626.stm
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Not only, the alternatives offered but also the European public’s opposition and 
scepticism about welcoming Turkey caused the European politicians to resist Turkish 
membership as well. On September 26, 2007, Sarkozy stated, “I do not think that Turkey 
has a place in Europe” claiming instead that Turkey's place was in “Asia Minor”.32 
In addition to all of these doubts and proposals, Turkey also faces another hurdle on 
its path to EU membership. Both France and Austria signalled referendum on Turkish 
membership. On 24 June 2008, the French Senate voted to drop a constitutional 
requirement to hold a popular vote before a new country can enter the EU, removing a key 
irritant in its relations with Turkey.33 Shortly after this, on 23 August 2008, Austria's 
Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik told the German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
“Coalition parties have agreed to go for a referendum if Turkey's accession talks are 
concluded in favour of a decision to prepare a membership agreement”.34 Besides, 
Sarkozy’s efforts to disable the progress in accession talks paid off with his prevention of 
opening of the chapter on economic and monetary policy in June 2007 (Bürgin, 2010: 421). 
Considering the 1999 Helsinki decisions and 2005 start of accession negotiations, 
these developments puts the EU’s credibility at stake. Both the alternatives like the 
privileged partnership and the referenda offered by France and Austria weakens the EU 
conditionality for Turkey. The risk of decrease in EU’s credibility was also observed by the 
former President of Finland, Ahtisaari in September 2009. He stated that “In 1999... we 
said that Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the union on the basis of the same 
criteria as apply to other candidate states. So it's the credibility of the EU at stake”.35
On the whole, this section argued that the Turkish-EU relations have been affected 
by the member state specific reservations such as the French reluctance and the Greek 
position to advance its own interests. Further complications arose when Cyprus became a 
member in 2004, as a divided island complicating Turkey’s already not so smooth 
accession process to the EU.  The mixed signals, the suspension of chapters and the 
32 http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/96/sarkozys-policy-on-turkeys-eu-accession-bad-for
33 http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/france-scraps-referendum-turkey-eu-bid/article-
173616
34 http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/austria-signals-referendum-turkey-eu-
accession/article-174868
35 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8241543.stm
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continuing blockage by Cyprus lessened the EU’s credibility in the Turkish eyes and made 
the accession more distant. This meant that the EU’s impact and conditionality similarly 
dwindled in the Turkish case; an EU that is no longer credible can not exercise 
conditionality effectively. 
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4. Chapter 3: Freedom of Speech in Turkey
The process of democratic consolidation in Turkey has begun in the foundation years of 
the Republic. However, for long years the Turkish democracy could not go beyond 
electoral democracy and took several blows in the head with military interventions -1960, 
1971, 1980-.  The limits of electoral democracy and Turkish desire to take part in the 
European Union forced Turkey to adopt more liberal values and consolidate its democracy. 
Especially the Copenhagen Criteria set up by the EU in 1993 pushed Turkey to adopt the 
values of liberal democracy like separation of powers, justice, equality and human rights. In 
line with these values, Turkey has been going through a huge reform process –even though 
there have been ups and downs in this process- in which these EU fostered norms and rules 
are transferred to structural, legal and political practices. 
This chapter will focus on the reforms that Turkey has been undergoing since its 
acceptance as a candidate country by the EU in 1999 with a special attention to the reforms 
regarding freedom of speech as one of the most important indicators of a functioning 
democracy. 
It is of great importance to highlight the fact that although Turkey was not in the list of 
candidate countries in 1997, the European Council asked the Commission to monitor the 
progress of Turkey from the 1998 just like it would do to other candidate countries. 
Though, it should be also reminded that the Turkish reforms gained momentum with the 
election of Justice and Development Party in 2002 and began to decelerate after the start of 
accession negotiations in 2005. In light of these, the state, progress and/or regression of 
freedom of speech in Turkey will be first observed through the Regular Commission 
reports on Turkey between 1998 and 2011. Secondly, the Freedom House Ratings between 
2002 and 2011 will be presented regarding Freedom of Press. Thirdly, Turkish cases that 
are brought to European Court of Human Rights between 1998- 2011 will be mentioned. 
The last part of this chapter will include an overview of the obstacles in Turkey’s freedom 
of speech from 1998 to 2011. 
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4.1. Regular Commission Reports on the State of Freedom of Expression, 
Press and Broadcasting in Turkey (1998- 2011)
After 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the Council decided that the Commission should 
monitor Turkey’s compliance with the EU standards, even though Turkish candidacy came 
with the Helsinki Summit in 1999, just like it would do to the candidate states. 
Accordingly, Turkey started to adopt EU rules and norms and make reforms in the area of 
speech. These adaptations and reforms gained momentum only after Turkey was granted 
with the candidate status in 1999 and started to slow down after the beginning of the 
accession negotiations in 2005. This section deals with the Turkish reforms to comply with 
the EU rules in the area of freedom of speech. It is crucial to emphasize that the reports of 
the Commission assesses freedom of speech in Turkey under the headings of “freedom 
expression”, “freedom of press” and “freedom of broadcasting” all of which will be taken 
into account. 
4.1.1. Turkish Reforms in Freedom of Speech 1998- 2011 
In the Cardiff European Council of June 1998, the Council asked the Commission to 
prepare Turkey for membership. Within these preparations, the Commission was also asked 
to report to an early Association Council on progress made36.  
Turkish progress on freedom of speech was quite slow between the years 1998 and 
2001 (see Table 1). There are no reforms neither in the area of freedom of expression nor of 
press nor of broadcasting until 2001. The only change that was mentioned in 1998 was the 
amendment of the 1982 Constitution in 1993. While in 2001, there are only minor changes 
in this respect. Keeping these in mind, it can be argued that there is either no process or 
very little progress in the area of freedom of speech between the years of 1998 and 2001.    
36 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession 
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Although the membership prospect was given to Turkey in 1999 with the candidacy, 
Turkish reforms could not begin until 2001 because of the reasons mentioned in the 
previously in Chapter 2. On October 2001, Turkey adopted its first Constitutional Package 
under the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis and it made several 
amendments to the 1982 Constitution by also referring to the Articles of the freedom of 
expression.  However, a more accelerated reform process begun only in 2002. 
“2002-2005” period can be marked as the peek point in the reform process of 
Turkey. Several reform packages and a lot of constitutional amendments were adopted 
during those years. A big step forward was taken between Turkey and the EU when Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) could get the majority of the seats in the elections at the end 
of 2002. AKP immediately accelerated the harmonization process. All of the reforms done 
and assessed by the Commission can be found in Table 2. 
In 2002, with the first reforms packages introduced amendments to the most 
controversial articles of the Turkish Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law. The articles 159-312 
of the Turkish Penal Code and 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terror law were strictly restricting the 
freedom of thought, expression, press and broadcasting. Article 159 of the Penal Code was 
prohibiting “insulting” state institutions; including the military while Article 312 imposed 
three-year prison sentences for incitement to commit an offence and incitement to religious 
or racial hatred. Both of these articles were amended in 2002. In addition, the same reform 
Table. 1 Reforms on Freedom of Expression, Speech and Broadcasting in Turkey reported by 
Regular Commission Reports (1998-2001)
Area Type  Change 
1998 - -
Amendment of Constitution 
in 1993 
End of state monopoly over media and 
proliferation of private radio and 
television stations
1999 - - - -
2000 - - - -
2001
Freedom of 
Press -
Amendment to Article 28 of 
the Constitution 
The provision that "publication shall 
not be made in any language prohibited 
by law" has been removed 
Freedom of 
Broadcasting -
Amendment to the status of 
High Audio-Visual Board 
(RTÜK)
Legalized retransmission, established 
ethnical standards that could have 
further limited the freedom of 
expression and plurality of ownership 
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Table 3. Reforms on Freedom of Expression, Speech and Broadcasting in Turkey reported by Regular Commission Reports (2002-2005)
Area Type  Change 
2002
Freedom of 
Expression
1st reform package 
Amendments to Article 159 of the 
Turkish Penal Code 
Maximum penalty was reduced from 6 years to 3 years 
Fines imposed for criticizing Turkish laws was abolished
3rd reform package
Additional amendments to Article 
159 of the Turkish Penal Code Expressions of criticism of institutions are no longer subject to penalties unless they are intended to "insult" or "deride” those institutions
1st reform package 
Amendments to Article 312 of the 
Turkish Penal Code 
Notion of "incitement" was added: "in a way that may be dangerous for public order"
Introduction of new type of criminal offence: "insulting part of people degradingly and in a way that hurts human dignity" 
Amendments to Article 7-8 of 
Anti-Terror Law 
Introduction of notion of "propaganda in connection with the terrorist organization in a way that encourages the use of terrorist methods"
Sentences were increased
Bans on television and radio broadcasting were shortened but fines were increased
Notion of "visual" propaganda was introduced
Freedom of 
Press 
1st reform package 
Amended Article 8 of the Anti-
Terror Law Fines increased from a min. 100 million TL to min. 3 billion TL
2nd reform package Modification of Press Law 
Did very little to ease restrictions on freedom of press: introduced the possibility to confiscate the printing equipment of publications 
found acting against "integrity of the nation, republican order, or the country's national security" 
Maximum suspension was shortened
3rd reform package Modified Press Law Replacement of prison sentences with heavy fines 
Freedom of 
Broadcasting 
1st reform package 
Amended Article 8 of the Anti-
Terror Law Maximum closure period for radio and TV channels was reduced from 15 to 7 days 
3rd reform package 
Modified High Audio-Visual 
Board (RTÜK) Allowance of broadcasts in different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives 
- Adoption of RTÜK law 
Censorship to Internet content: web pages are subjected to get the approval of authorities before being published
Prohibition of broadcasts which violate "the existence and independence of Turkish Republic, the territorial and national integrity of the 
State, reforms and principles of Atatürk" or "instigate the community to violence, terror or ethnic discrimination" 
2003
Freedom of 
Expression
6th reform package
Repeal of Article 8 of the Anti-
Terror Law "Propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state" was repealed
7th reform package 
Amendment to Article159 of the 
Penal Code Minimum sentence was reduced from one year to six months
Amendment to 169 of the Penal 
Code Removed the provision sanctioning "actions which facilitated the operation of terrorist organizations in any manner whatsoever" 
Additional Amendments to Article 
7 of the Anti-Terror Law
Introduced the notion of "propaganda in connection with the terrorist organizations a way encourages the use of terrorist methods" by 
replacing "terrorist methods" with "resorting to violence or other terrorist means"
Fines increased ten-fold while length of prison sentences remains at one to five years 
6th reform package
Amendments to the Cinema, Video 
and Music Works Law 
The scope for suspensions were narrowed to cover only offences considered to undermine the fundamental characteristics of Republic 
and the indivisible integrity of the state 
Any administrative decision to suspend a work in these fields must be confirmed by a judge within 24 hours
Freedom of 
Press 
4th reform package
Amendment of Article 15 of Press 
Law Now contains provisions that protect the owners of periodicals editors and writers from being forced to reveal sources 
7th reform package 
Amendment of Article 426 of Law 
765
Article has been added to exempt scientific artistic works and "works of literary value" from the scope of the article which bans 
publication on the grounds of moral principles 
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Amendment of Article 427 of Law 
765
Confiscated publications can no longer be destroyed or burned on the grounds of "hurting people's" feelings or "exploiting people's 
sexual desires"
Freedom of 
Broadcasting 
- Regulation was issued It permits the state broadcasting corporation, TRT, to broadcast in languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens 
6th reform package Legislative Amendment 
Extending the possibility of broadcasting in languages and dialects used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives to private stations, in 
addition to TRT
2004
Freedom of 
Expression - Adoption of New Penal Code
Narrows the scope of some articles that have been used to convict those expressing non-violent opinion.
Minimum sentence for defamation was reduced 
Article 159 -named as Article 301 in the new penal code- and a provision criminalizing religious personnel for criticizing the state is 
unaltered. 
Article 305 was limited by Article 127 in the new penal code
Article 216_Individuals can be convicted under this article only if their "incitement to enmity and hatred" constitutes "a clear and close 
danger" 
Penalty for discouraging people from performing military service has been increased. 
Freedom of 
Press -
Amendment of Article 30 of the 
Constitution Confiscation or seizure of printing equipment of a publishing house is no longer allowed in any circumstances 
Adoption of New Press Law 
Right of journalists not to disclose their sources is strengthened; the right to reply and correction is reinforced; prison sentences are 
mostly replaced by fines; sanctions such as closure of publications; halting distribution and confiscating printing machines are removed; 
and the possibility to confiscate printed materials has been reduced. 
Article 19 states that those who publish information concerning ongoing court proceedings will be punished by heavy fines.
Freedom of 
Broadcasting - New Regulation 
Established the possibility for private national television and radio channels, in addition to the state broadcaster TRT, to broadcast in 
languages other than Turkish
Sets strict time limits for broadcasts in other languages
2005
Freedom of 
Expression - Amendments to New Penal Code
Aggravated sentences were removed in many cases
Acts of expression with the purpose of providing information/aim at criticism should not be criminalized. 
Reasoning associated with Article 305 was deleted
Scope of Article 125 on defamation was narrowed
A number of articles that were used to restrict freedom of expression remained.
Freedom of 
Press -
Establishment of a New Legal 
Assistance and Support Service To provide a lawyer free of charge of journalists facing charges brought against them under provisions of the new Code 
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package also included amendments to Article 7 and 8 of the Anti-terror law. However, the 
Commission found those amendments insufficient of securing the right to freedoms. The 
second reform package included modification on the press law even though it did very little 
to ease restrictions on freedom of press. Same year, the third reform package was adopted 
and it modified the High-Audio Visual Board (RTÜK) by allowing broadcasts in different 
languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. In line with 
this, a brand new RTÜK law was adopted censoring the Internet content and prohibiting 
the broadcasts which violate “the existence and independence of Turkish Republic, the 
territorial and national integrity of the State, reforms and principles of Atatürk” or 
“instigate the community to violence, terror or ethnic discrimination”. In short, the 2002 
was an efficient year to adopt new legislations to guarantee the right to freedom of speech. 
At the end of 2002 but mostly in 2003, AKP government continued the reform 
process started by the previous coalition government. It adopted additional reform packages 
in line with NPAA. In regards to freedom of expression, it repealed the Article 8 of the 
Anti-terror law within the context of the 6th reform package. Plus, te Cinema, video, Music 
works law was also amended by narrowing down its scope to cover only offences 
considered to undermine the fundamental characteristics of Republic and the indivisible 
integrity of the state. In the next reform package, the Article 159 of the Penal Code and 
Article 7 of the Anti-Terror law were amended once more. Meanwhile Article 169 of the 
Criminal Code which stated as follows, “Any person who, knowing that such an armed 
gang or organisation is illegal, assists it, harbours its members, provides it with food, 
weapons and ammunition or clothes or facilitates its operations in any manner whatsoever 
shall be sentenced to not less than three and not more than five years' imprisonment.”, was 
also amended. The same year, there have been some legal changes regarding the freedom of 
press as well. In the 4th reform package, the Article 15 of the Press law was revised to protect 
the owners of periodicals editors and writers from being forced to reveal sources. While the 
7th package has altered and narrowed down the scope of Article 426 of the Law 765 on 
banning the publication on the grounds of moral principles, it prohibited the destruction or 
burning of the confiscated publications on the grounds of  “hurting people's feelings” or 
“exploiting people's sexual desires” by amending the Article 427 of the same Law. On the 
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press freedom it issued a regulation that permits TRT to broadcast in languages and dialects 
traditionally used by Turkish citizens.
The following year, 2004, constitute an inventive period for reforms. The highlight 
reform of that year in regards to freedom of expression was the introduction of the new 
penal code which narrows the scope of some articles that had been used to convict those 
expressing non-violent opinions. One of the most attention grabbing changes was the 
replacement of Article 159 of the Penal Code with the New Article 301. Although, the 
introduction of this new penal code seemed like a big improvement it caused several 
significant debates on the restriction of freedom of expression in the following years. 
Another big change was the adoption of the New Press Law through which the Right of 
journalists not to disclose their sources is strengthened; the right to reply and correction is 
reinforced; prison sentences are mostly replaced by fines; sanctions such as closure of 
publications; halting distribution and confiscating printing machines are removed; and the 
possibility to confiscate printed materials has been reduced. All in all, 2004 was the 
landmark of changes regarding freedom of speech in Turkey. 
2005 can be considered as the last year of accelerated reform period in Turkey. It 
amended the New Penal Code that was introduced a year ago by removing aggravated 
sentences and allowing the acts of expression with the purpose of providing 
information/aim at criticism. In addition, a New Legal Assistance and Support Service was 
established providing free legal consultant to journalists facing charges under the new penal 
code. 
After the accelerated compliance efforts of Turkey between the years of 2002-2005, 
speed of adoption of EU rules started to diminish (See table 3) As reported by the 
Commission report, only new legal initiative in regards to freedom of expression was the 
circular issued by Ministry of Justice which mainly instructs prosecutors to take into 
consideration both Turkish legislation and the ECHR. The Commission did not report any 
reform taken under freedom of expression, press and broadcasting in the years of 2007, 
2009 and 2010. The only alterations recorded by the progress reports in the “2006-2010” 
period were the amendment to the new Article 301 of the Penal Code in 2008 and the 
Invalidation of Article 216 of the Press Act as well as the Law on Establishment and 
broadcasting Principles that only provide partial improvements as regards to the 
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interpretation of certain rules on broadcasting bans and sanctions imposed on broadcasters 
in 2011. 
Table 2. Reforms on Freedom of Expression, Speech and Broadcasting in Turkey 
reported by Regular Commission Reports (2006-2011)
Area Type  Change 
2006
Freedom of 
Expression 
(Including 
the Media) -
A circular issued by 
Ministry of Justice
To instruct prosecutors to take into 
consideration both Turkish legislation and 
the ECHR along with a monthly 
monitoring mechanism of criminal 
investigations and court cases against press 
and media 
2007 - - - -
2008
Freedom of 
Expression
- Amendments to 
Article 301of the 
Turkish Criminal 
Code
Wording of the article had changed and 
lowered the upper limit of the penalty and 
abolished the higher penalty for insults in a 
foreign country. 
-
Introduced a requirement for permission to 
be obtained from the Justice Minister to 
launch a criminal investigation. 
2009 - - - -
2010 - - - -
2011
Freedom of 
Press -
Invalidation of Article 
216 of the Press Act
Prosecutors will no longer be bound to 
certain time restraints if they want to file a 
case following a publication in a periodical. 
Freedom of 
Broadcasting -
Law on Establishment 
and broadcasting 
Principles 
Partial improvements as regards to the 
interpretation of certain rules on 
broadcasting bans and sanctions imposed 
on broadcasters.
Potential fines have been substantially 
increased. 
In the last 5 years of the Progress Reports, rather than reforms or amendments that 
secure the freedom of expression, press and broadcasting the Commission mostly criticize 
the status of these freedoms especially in regards to the applications of the Article 301 of 
the New Penal Code as well as the bans on the several books, periodicals and Web pages. 
As these does not fall under the reforms, they will be mentioned in the last section of this 
Chapter.  
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4.2. Freedom House rankings on Turkey
Freedom House supports democratic change, monitors freedom, and advocates for 
democracy and human rights around the world.37 As it is a total independent organization 
from the EU, it is also fruitful to take the Freedom House rankings on freedom of speech in 
Turkey into account. However, the span of these rankings is slightly different than of the 
EU. Thus, the most relevant heading that the Freedom of House has to the scope of this 
thesis is the annual reports on the “Freedom of Press”. The special report on the “freedom 
on the net” which was published in 2009 and on “Turkey in Transit” published in 2008 
does not rank Turkey but includes parts that assess the situation in regards to freedom of 
speech in Turkey. This part will include solely the ranking of Turkey between 2002 and 
2011 but the other assessments will be mentioned in the last section of this chapter. 
4.2.1. Freedom of Press in Turkey 
Freedom House has divided the countries into three main categories in relation to 
the status of freedoms in those countries. The scale to determine these categories go from 0 
to 100; 0 represents the highest level of freedom while 100 the lowest. The countries that 
get from 0 to 30 in the scale are considered as “free”; the ones graded from 31 to 60 are 
“partly free”; and finally the ones that fall between 61 and 100 are identified as “not free” 
countries.  Taken these into account, from 2002 to 2011 Turkey was characterized as 
“partly free” with a minimum score of 48 in 2005 and in 2006 and a maximum of 58 in 
2002. This range makes Turkey closer to “not free” countries rather than “free” ones. 
The total score of freedom of press is 100, which is the sum of three sub-categories 
determined by Freedom House. The first category is the “legal environment” that is 
relevant to freedom of press; it has a 30% role in the total score. The second category is the 
“political influences” over press freedom which has 40% effect on the overall score. And 
the last determinant is the “economic pressures” that impact the freedom of press 
constituting the other 30% of the total rating. Considering these, the ranking of Turkish 
press freedom from 2002 to 2011 can be seen in the following charts. 
37 http://www.freedomhouse.org/about-us
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Chart 1. The Scores of Legal Environment in Turkey in 
regards to Freedom of Press  (2002-2011)
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The first graph shows the state of legal environment in Turkey from 2002 to 2011 
that intervenes with the freedom of press. It can be clearly seen that the rate of legal 
environment in 2002 is the least convenient environment for the freedom of press in the 
country. Over three years, it gradually goes down to 16, the least, in 2005 representing the 
best legal environment for press freedom. Starting from the year 2006, it steadily goes up to 
22 in six years to make up the score for 2011. This means that the reforms that two Turkish 
governments (the coalition government until December 2002 and AKP government until 
present day) designed became most effective for freedom of press until 2005 while they 
once more started to regress and became almost as ineffective as the reforms made in the 
year 2002. 
The second chart indicates the scores of political influence over press freedom in 
Turkey between the years 2002-2011. The score for political influence stagnates at 23 
between the years 2002 and 2004. Starting from the year 2005, it gradually falls down to 19 
in 2007. It suddenly goes up to 20 in 2008 and again drops down to 18 and levels there for 
two years until the end of 2010. In 2011, the score of political influence rises to 21 getting 
even with the score of 2005.  
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Chart 2. The Scores of Political Influence in Turkey over 
Freedom of Press (2002-2011)
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The third graph represents the scores of economic pressures on the freedom of press 
in Turkey between 2002- 2011. It starts with a score of 9 out of 30 in the year 2002 and 
levels there for two years, till the end of 2003. In 2004, it rises up to 11 and stagnates there 
for the remaining seven years until 2011. This shows that the economic pressures did not 
change its level of influence over freedom of press in Turkey in the last decade. 
Chart 3. The scores of Economic Pressures on Freedom of 
Press in Turkey (2002-2011)
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The last chart (Chart 4) displays the total score of press freedom in Turkey in the 
last ten years (2002-2011).  The score for the year 2002 starts as 58 and declines as much as 
48 in the year 2005 and 2006. It slowly increases to 49 in 2007 and 51 in 2008. In 2009, it 
drops to 50, whereas it starts going up again with 51 in the year 2010 and 54 in 2011. 
Chart 4. Total Score on Freedom of Press in Turkey (2002-2011)
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When Chart 4 is compared to Chart 1, the score of legal environment enabling or 
disabling freedom of press in Turkey, the trends in both charts overlap. Moreover, the 
scores of political influences in Chart 2 and the economic pressures in Chart 3 do not 
follow the trends in the Chart of the total score. This indicates that the most influential 
score on the rate of the freedom of press in Turkey is the score of legal environment which 
constitutes the reforms made between 2002 and 2011 in Turkey regarding freedom of 
speech.  
4.3. Turkish Cases in the European Court of Human Rights (1998- 2011)
There have been a vast number of cases38 brought against Turkey to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) with respect to the Article 10 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights. For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to see the number of above 
mentioned cases between 1998 and 2011. Since not all of these cases are evaluated as a 
38 All of the court cases brought to ECHR against Turkey on the grounds of violation of 
Article 10 of EcoHR can be found at HUDOC database
www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-
Law/Decisions+and+judgments/HUDOC+database/ 
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violation of Article 10 by ECHR. Thereto, in this section, only the ones that are found to 
violate this Article are taken into account. Chart 539, below, includes the number of resolved 
cases that were brought to ECHR on grounds of the most controversial Articles (159 –later 
on became 301- and 312) of the Turkish Criminal Code or the Articles (7 and 8 – repealed 
in 2003- ) of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts. This section will not include any content of 
these cases since there are too many of them. However, the most controversial of these will 
be touched upon in the last section of this Chapter. 
Chart 5. The Number  of Closed cases brought against Turkey  to ECHR 
on the grounds of violation of Article 10 (1998- 2010) 
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This chart shows the number of resolved cases brought to the European Court of 
Human Rights by individuals against Turkey on the grounds of violation of Article 10 
between the years 1998 and 2010. The number of cases increases 12 to 20 from 1998 to 
1999. In 2000, the number of these cases dramatically drops to 6 and continues to drop 
slightly to 4 in 2001. In 2002, the number goes up to 8 followed by a drop to 7 in 2003 and 
goes back to 8 once more in 2004. This number suddenly goes up to 11 in 2005 but 
39 The number of cases are calculated from the list provided by ECHR Document 
Collections at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?
sessionid=87616191&skin=hudoc-en
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decreases to 4 in 2006. In 2007, the number climbs up to 11 again. In the last three years, 
the fluctuation in the numbers is significant with a drop to 6 in 2008 and a sharp increase to 
21 in 2009 followed by a rock-bottom of 2 in 2010. This inconsistency in the number of 
resolved cases strongly overlaps with the number of reforms made in Turkey to conform to 
the EU conditions with respect to freedom of speech between the years 1999 and 2005. 
However, the variation of number of cases after 2006 does not coincide with the reform 
process. 
4.4. The obstacles in Turkey’s freedom of speech from 1998 to 2011
Till this section, this Chapter covered the reforms that Turkey has gone through, the 
Freedom House ratings of Press Freedom in Turkey, and the number of resolved cases 
which were violations of Article 10 of the ECHR in the last decade. In addition to all these, 
this section will give insights on the state of freedom of speech –freedom of expression and 
press- in Turkey for the same period. 
Starting with the first progress report on Turkey published by the main concerns and 
obstacles in the way of freedom of speech were the two articles of the Turkish Penal Code - 
Article 159 concerning insults to parliament, army, republic and judiciary and Article 312 
concerning incitement to racial, ethnic or religious enmity- and the two articles of the anti-
terrorist law, namely Article 7 and 8 disseminating separatists propaganda. These were the 
common concerns that were mentioned both in the Regular Commission Reports on Turkey 
and the annual reports on the Freedom of Press of Freedom House. The 1999 Commission 
Report40 on turkey states that 347 individuals under Article 159 and 312 of the Penal Code 
and 1317 of then under Anti-Terrorist Law were sentenced. 
In the year 2000, the Commission reported41 that the courts continue to restrict the 
freedom of expression notably when the issue is relevant to the population of Kurdish 
40 For the text of Regular Commission report on Turkey, 1999: 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/Turkey_Progress_R
eport_1999.pdf
41 For the text of Regular Commission report on Turkey, 2000: 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/Turkey_Progress_R
eport_2000.pdf
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origin. The case brought against Akin Birdal, the chairman of Human Rights Association 
under Article312 the Penal Code. 
Commission reports in 200142 and Freedom House (2002)43 ratings stated a total 
number of 80 journalists are reported to have been imprisoned for political activities or for 
alleged infringements of various laws. The case of Mehmet Uzun, on the grounds of 
insulting the judiciary and the republic; case of Fikret Başkaya for dissemination of 
separatist propaganda; and the confiscation of the book Mehmet Uzun are among some of 
the examples. It is also reported that, 9000 prisoners were convicted for crimes connected 
to freedom of expression. The same year marked 261 people under Articles 159 and 312 
and 324 people under the Anti terror law convicted. Moreover, 10 radio and TV stations 
received penalties for closure for unacceptable comments on current events in August 2001. 
Freedom House (2002) also highlighted that despite the efforts allowing broadcasting in 
Kurdish, in November 2001 several media outlets were suspended. 
The Commission Report of 200244 included the report of Association of Turkish 
editors on Ma 2002. It indicated that 40 books by 39 writers were banned in a very short 
period of time. While Ministry of Inferior accounted 1309 books and periodicals that were 
confiscated in 2000. The same year in March, RTÜK banned a large number of TV and 
radio stations including CNN Türk. Freedom House (2003) covered the imprisonment of 
Sinan Kara, a journalist, as a result of alleged threatening of the son of Prime Minister 
Erdoğan. Plus, Turkish generals filed a lawsuit against the daily newspaper Zaman on the 
grounds for describing generals as pretentious and incompetent. 
In 2003, The Commission45 criticised RTÜK on heavy penalties given to private TV 
and radio station and accusations of violation of certain principles of the state. The closure 
of Çınar TV for a month constituted an example.  
42 For the text of Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2001: 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/Turkey_Progress_R
eport_2001.pdf
43 All Freedom House ratings regarding Freedom of Press can be found at 
http://old.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16
44 For the text of the Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2002: 
http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/uyelik/progre02.pdf
45 For the text of the Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2003: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_en.pdf
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The following year, 2004, Commission46 highlighted numerous cases of journalists, 
writers; publishers sentenced for reasons that contravenes with the standards of ECHR. For 
instance, in May, a journalist was sent to prison on the basis of 1951 law on the “Crimes 
against Atatürk”. The same year denoted 43 books of 37 writers, 17 publishers in trial and 
18 books banned, only in the first half of the year. Meanwhile, RTÜK banned ART TV, 
based in Diyarbakır, for 30 days in violation of the principle of the “indivisible unity of the 
state”.   
It can be argued that the year 2005 is the peek of the restrictions on freedom of 
expression because of a variety of cases brought in the court as a result of the Article 301 
New Turkish Penal Code which is the replacement of the previous Article 159. The 
Commission47 emphasized the case against Orhan Pamuk opened in August in regards to 
one of his remarks he made in an interview for a Swiss paper on the killings of Armenians 
and Kurds in Turkey. In October, Hrant Dink was convicted under Article 301 and given a 
suspended six month prison sentence in relation to the article he has written on the 
Armenian Diaspora. He also faced another trial because of the speech he gave in a 
conference in 2002. A moth later, in September, Emin Karaca had to pay a fine because of 
his critics on the past actions of Turkish military. It is of great importance to also mention 
the legal actions initiated by Prime Minister Erdoğan, against a cartoonist and satirists in 
June. The same month, a journalist got three months of imprisonment. Moreover, 
International PEN recoded 60 journalists, writers and publishers under judicial process. 
Compared to 2005, 2006 was a calmer period. However, the court confirmed a six 
month suspended prison sentence for Hrant Dink on the basis of Article 301. Commission 
also denoted its concerns on the weakening of the independence of regulatory body by the 
actions of RTÜK in its 2006 report.48 
46 For the text of the Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2004: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf
47 For the text of the Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2005: 
www.mfa.gov.tr/data/AB/  2005  _progress.PDF  
48 For the text of the Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2006: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/Nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf
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The Progress Report in 200749 indicates that the number of people prosecuted and 
convicted under the Penal Code almost doubled in 2006 compared to 2005 but it further 
increased in 2007 and half of these cases are taken under Article 301 –the number was 
indicated as 55 by Freedom House (2008)-. Freedom House (2008) highlighted that 
although the assassination of Hrant Dink charges were subsequently dropped, his son and 
the owner of Agos were convicted on the same charges. 
Following year, 2008, Commission50 states that the implications of Article 301 
remain the same. Meanwhile, frequent website bans with disproportionate scopes and 
durations are observed; the ban on YouTube is the most significant case. According to 
Turkish Press Freedom organization refereed by BiaNet, the number of prosecuted 
journalists, publishers, activists increased from 254 in 2007 to 435 in 2008. Additionally, 
Alper Turgut, journalist, was fined with 20.000 TL on the grounds for reporting a torture 
case was thrown out because too much time has passed (Freedom House, 2009). What’s 
more is that Cihan Hayırsever, editor of Gğney Marmara Yaşam, was killed in December 
after a number of threats he got as a result of his focus on local corruption. The same year, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan filed his fifth law suit against satirist magazines for unflattering 
cover image and Hürriyet announced that Prime Minister’s office had revoked the 
accredation of seven senior reporters without explanation in November 2008 (Freedom 
House, 2009). 
The year, 2009 marked the revisions on the controversial Article 301, thus, it was no 
longer used systematically. Accordingly, Commission51 observed a decline in the number of 
prosecutions under this article. Though, the tax related procedures against Doğan Media 
Holding and infliction of high fines remained as concerns to restrict freedom of press. 
Moreover, civil procedures are filed by politicians in respect to violation of their rights by 
49 For the text of the Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2007: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.
pdf
50 For the text of the Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2008:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-
documents/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf
51 For the text of the Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2009:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf
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publishers, journalists, writers and politicians. Plus, the website bans continue to limit the 
freedom of Internet; YouTube ban continues to take place since May 2008. 
Freedom House (2011) reports that 104 journalists were tried in 2010 on alleged 
offenses and 30 of them end up in prison at the end of the year. For instance, Editor in chief 
of Kurdish Azadiya Welat, Vedat Kurşun, was sentenced to 166 years in prison on the 
grounds for disseminating PKK propaganda and the editor manager, Emine Demir, was 
given 138 years of sentence because of the same reason. The Ergenekon Case and the 
number of cases opened against journalists raises concerns of the Commission in 2010.52 
Freedom House also reports that at the end of 2010 at least 47 journalists remained in 
detention pending trial related to Ergenekon Case. 
The latest Commission Report on the Progress on Turkey was published in 2011. 
Commission indicates serious concerns regarding the imprisonment of journalists and the 
number of journalists who are in detention. Meanwhile, RTÜK still continued to warn and 
fine several TV channels failing to respect the privacy of historical characters –the case of 
TV series “Magnificent Century”-; discussion on homosexuality –the case of Haber Türk 
and Digitürk’s screening of Sex and the City 2-; and inclusion of homosexual scenes –
ATV’s display of two men in the same bed in TV programme-. 
All in all, it can be stated that from although there have been numerous reforms 
adopted, especially in the 2002- 2005 period, the restrictions on freedom of speech 
remained the same and even got more frequent and stricter in certain cases –like the case of 
Article 301- between the years of 1999- 2011. It can be argued that freedom of speech in 
Turkey has never reached the level required by the EU. One can even state that when the 
murders, convictions and detention periods of journalists, publishers and writers are 
considered, the state of freedom of expression in Turkey did not even get close to reach the 
standards endorsed by the EU for accession. 
The next chapter of the thesis will connect the situation described in this chapter 
with the second chapter of the thesis trying to support the main hypothesis of the thesis 
which is “when the credibility of the EU membership prospect is high, the impact of the 
EU’s political conditionality is substantial on the freedom of speech as an indicator of 
democracy” through the case of Turkey. 
52 For the text of the Regular Commission Report on Turkey, 2009:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf 
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5. Conclusion 
Turkey’s relationship with the EU has been a long and complicated because of the 
changing dynamics between parties. After the establishment of the Copenhagen Criteria in 
1993, Turkey, just as other countries aspiring for EU membership, was bound to fulfil the 
Criteria. The real marathon of Turkish harmonization process has started after the 1998 
Council Summit in Cardiff as even though Turkey was left out from the list of candidates 
declared in 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the Council demanded Commission to monitor 
Turkey and to publish Progress Reports on the state of Turkish progress. This meant that 
the EU still wanted to have close relations with Turkey.   
The real promise for membership came with the 1999 Helsinki Summit when EU 
granted Turkey with the candidate status and developed a pre-accession strategy which 
Turkey was a part of. However, because of EU’S hesitations over Turkish membership 
observed first in 1997 through the exclusion of Turkey both from Agenda 2000 and 
Luxembourg and then, in 2000 in Nice Summit –Turkey was not considered during the 
planning of institutional reforms which will operationalize after the next enlargement-. 
Thus, the credibility of EU was not high for Turkey. As a result, the EU political 
conditionality was relatively weak on the process of democratic consolidation, particularly 
in the area of freedom of speech in Turkey until the year of 2002. A very slow process was 
observed by the Commission Reports in regards to freedom of expression, press and 
broadcasting between 1998- 2001. A slow improvement was observed with the minor 
changes in relative legislations only in 2001 (see Table 1)
The things started to shift radically in the year 2002. First of all, the government has 
changed in Turkey. In general elections of 2002, AKP won the elections by getting the 
necessary number of seats in the parliament and became the governing party with the 
leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan. The decision making process of the government became a 
lot easier and less complicated compare the one of the previous coalition government 
-DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition-. Secondly, during the Copenhagen Summit in 2002, the 
Council declared that the accession negotiations were completed with Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia 
and that they would become full members of the Union in May 2004. This gave hopes for 
Turkey that once a country comply with the EU criteria, it is possible to become members 
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and thus, increased the credibility of the EU. Furthermore, during the same Summit in 
2002, the EU promised Turkey that in the case of compliance, the accession negotiations 
would start with Turkey in 2004. Both of these incidents contributed to the credibility of 
EU by explicitly giving the carrot of membership prospect to Turkey. From this point 
onwards, Turkey has undergone a major reform process. Between the years 2002- 2005 
Commission reported a total of 7 reform packages including amendments to contradictory 
article of the penal code and anti-terrorist law restricting freedom of speech; adaption of a 
New Turkish Penal Code; and various new regulations in the areas of press and 
broadcasting freedoms (see Table 2). Number of court cases brought to ECHR on the basis 
of Article 10 of the Convention regarding freedom of expression has decreased from 20 in 
1999 to 8 in 2004 (see Chart 5). Freedom Hose also reported a remarkable change in the 
state of legal environment (see chart 1); the scores go dramatically down between 2002 and 
2005 pointing to a significant progress on legal terms fostering press freedom. While 
Freedom House ratings regarding political influence (see Chart 2) and economic pressures 
(see chart 3) on press freedom were not noteworthy because of their stability, the total score 
of freedom of press in Turkey reached its highest levels in 2005 and 2006 (see Chart 4). 
The Commission Progress Report in 2003 was assuring; it stated that the packages 
political reforms were found significant and the Council acknowledged the efforts and 
determination of AKP to the EU project. This report, followed by the report in 2004 
pointing out the progress in civil control over military and the developments regarding 
political reforms as well as the efforts made in Cyprus issue –the “yes” vote for ANNAN 
Plan-, resulted in the beginning of accession negotiations. This became another landmark in 
Turkey’s relations with Europe. After the start of accession negotiations in 2005,  the 
dynamic of fulfilling the criteria change because now, it is not only the adoption of political 
criteria but also the harmonization of the national law with the EU acquis. The process of 
opening and closing acquis chapters involves not only the EU actors but also the member 
states. As each member has an equal say for opening the chapter, it can be argued that this 
process becomes more politicised than the process of evaluating the political progress in a 
candidate country. Plus, the trend of offering Turkey alternatives than membership –by 
Germany, France and Austria- along with the possibility of holding referendum for Turkish 
membership in France and Austria caused Turkey to get mixed signals from the EU. All of 
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these factors caused a dramatic decline in the credibility of the EU political conditionality 
thus, its effect on Turkish democracy started to fade. This can be seen through the 
Commission Reports between 2006- 2011; minor or no reforms on the area of freedom of 
expression, press or broadcasting are recorded (see table 3). In addition, Freedom of House 
also shows that the legal environment for press freedom (see chart 1) as well as press 
freedom (see chart 4) in Turkey started to regress from 2006 onwards. The score of 2011 is 
nearly the same with the one of 2003. 
In addition to all of these, the numbers of cases, indictments, detentions, the 
murders and the bans are strictly restricting and pressuring the freedom of speech in Turkey 
from 2005 onwards. Although, a new penal code has been introduced in 2005 in order to 
remove all the limitation on freedom of speech, the new penal code, namely the Article 
301, raises serious concerns on the matter. What’s more is that the number of journalists, 
publishers, writers who face numerous law cases and who are in prison or in detention for 
long periods of time increased from 2005 onwards, not only on the basis of Article 301, but 
in the framework of Ergenekon case and in regards to subjects including Kurdish 
minorities. The daily newspaper, one of the mainstream newspapers, reported the total 
number of journalist in prison as 105 on 30 January 2012.53  
On one hand, there are still serious concerns on the freedom of speech in Turkey. 
On the other hand, the EU started to loose its charm for Turkey. Considering the fact that 
even though the relations between Turkey and the EU has altered enormously over the last 
decade, Turkey still need an anchor to consolidate its democracy and EU still constitutes a 
relevant role model. Yet, it is for sure that EU’s main foreign policy instrument, 
conditionality, has been loosing its influence over Turkey as a result of its fading 
credibility.
All of these show that the factors that are determining the credibility of the EU have 
been varying over the years. Firstly, the reliability of EU’s delivery of threats and promises 
has been shifting like in the cases of Agenda 2000, Luxembourg Summit and 2000 Nice 
Summit. In most of the cases, EU’s capability to deliver its promises were valid even 
though its consistency of delivering rewards have been hindering because of the mixed 
53 http://blog.milliyet.com.tr/bir-gazeteci-daha-tutuklandi----tutuklu-gazetecilerin-sayisi-
105-e-yukseldi---/Blog/?BlogNo=346063
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signals sent by the member states –mostly by France, Germany -. The data provided in this 
thesis show that these variations have impact on the Turkish reform process. This thesis 
showed that there is a positive correlation between the credibility of EU’s conditionality 
and its effect on promoting democracy in the case of Turkey. Between the years 1998 and 
2011, whenever the credibility of the EU was high for Turkey, the reform process gained 
speed; and whenever it declined, the democratic consolidation regressed. 
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